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Affirmative action is now, as it has been since it began, a hot
button issue in American politics.' There is a pervading sense in the
country that affirmative action is no longer necessary, that
opportunities for minorities2 have become equalized or at least are not
worth the "cost" of depriving deserving individuals of jobs based on
their demographic characteristics instead of their ability.3  The
* Law clerk to the Honorable Dana Fabe, Chief Justice of the Alaska Supreme Court. J.D.,
Stanford Law School, 2001; Ph.D. (Political Science), University of Minnesota, 2000; B.A.,
Amherst College, 1993. The author would like to thank Tom Grey, Barbara Fried, Erika
Wayne, John Zumbrunnen, Eric Riedel, and Fred Dretske for their helpful comments on and
criticisms of earlier drafts of this Article. Despite their best efforts, the reader may, but
hopefully will not, perceive flaws in my argument. For these I accept full blame.
1. See Jonathan Tilove, Where They Stand on Race and Civil Rights Gore Unequivocal in
Support for Affirmative Action; Bush's Stance Is Not So Clear, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 8, 2000, at A3.
The issue also touches on potential new Supreme Court Justices and their effects on the law. A
recent Newsweek cover story on the likely effects of either a Bush or Gore victory on the Supreme
Court listed affirmative action as one of the "cutting-edge issues" that an altered Supreme Court
might face in the coming years. Stuart Taylor Jr., The Supreme Question, NEWSWEEK, July 10,
2000, at 22. A few weeks later, this article was followed by a cover story titled Redefining Race in
America on the increasing phenomena of multicultural/multiracial identifications. Jon
Meacham, The New Face of Race, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 18, 2000, at 38.
2. It should be admitted up front that this Article does not discuss affirmative action in
relation to multiracial identities. This is not uncommon among writers on affirmative action,
perhaps because the percentages, though increasing, are still relatively small. While this issue is
beyond the scope of this Article, it could have a significant impact on how racial classification
statistics are determined for higher education admissions. For a further discussion of multi-
racial identities, including some discussion of the implications of this phenomenon to
government forms requiring a singular racial identification, see generally RACIALLY MIXED
PEOPLE IN AMERICA (Maria P.P. Root ed., 1992).
3. A recent survey shows mixed feelings among Americans about affirmative action.
When asked, "Generally speaking, do you favor or oppose affirmative action programs for
minorities?," 52% of respondents in 1995 responded that they in fact do favor such policies, as
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backlash against affirmative action, motivated by what many see as
reverse discrimination against white males,4 is reflected in former
President Clinton's call to "mend it, but don't end it,"5 a sign of the
accommodation necessary to preserve a frequently unpopular policy in
the face of intense political pressure as manifested in a recent federal
court decision in Texas as well as in California's university action and
subsequent statewide referendum calling for the elimination of
affirmative action in public universities to create what advocates of
race-neutral policies consider to be a completely colorblind admissions
process.6
compared to 29% opposed. Los ANGELES TIMES POLL, SURVEY NO. 356, Mar. 1995, in 5 CQ
RESEARCHER 374 (1995). The survey results showed approval of affirmative action by a 45% to
35% margin among whites, with white men being the only demographic surveyed to oppose
affirmative action for minorities. Id. Even white men, though, felt that we are not close to
eliminating discrimination. Id. However, when asked about specific policies, the opinions of
affirmative action were reversed. When asked about admission to public universities, 55% said
that acceptance should be based solely on the academic record of the student, whereas only 36%
felt that acceptance should also be based upon the composition of the general population. Id.
Only blacks took the latter position, with Hispanics being evenly split. Id. An even larger
margin (72% to 22%) believed that racial preferences should be used in job hiring practices to
correct past inequities. Id.
For a further overview of contemporary attitudes toward affirmative action in higher
education admissions, see Carol M. Swain et al., Life After Bakke Where Whites and Blacks
Agree: Public Support for Fairness in Educational Opportunities, 16 HARV. BLACKLETTER L. J.
147, 161-65 (2000).
4. Then again, one could question, following Lester Thurow's lead, why racial groups are
thought by many to be undeserving of government aid when few people have problems with
other targeted programs such as aid to farmers. Lester Thurow, Affirmative Action in a Zero-
Sum Society, in FROM DIFFERENT SHORES: PERSPECTIVES ON RACE AND ETHNICITY IN
AMERICA 235, 237 (Ronald Takaki ed., 2d ed., 1994). This problem becomes especially vexing
considering that people can abandon their occupation as farmers if they are unhappy with their
situation, whereas they cannot abandon their racial status.
5. Todd S. Purdum, President Shows Fervent Support for Goals of Affirmative Action, N.Y.
TIMES, July 20, 1995, at Al; Excerpts from Clinton Talk on Affirmative Action, N.Y. TIMES, July
20, 1995, at B10.
6. See generally Corinne E. Anderson, A Current Perspective: The Erosion of Affirmative
Action in University Admissions, 32 AKRON L. REV. 181 (1999) (discussing recent trends in and
political sentiments surrounding affirmative action policies in university admissions); Jennifer C.
Brooks, The Demise of Affirmative Action and the Effect on Higher Education Admissions: A
Chilling Effect or Much Ado About Nothing?, 48 DRAKE L. REV. 567 (2000) (relating the history
behind Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996) and California Prop. 209); Thomas Glen
Martin, Jr., UCLA Law School Admissions in the Aftermath of the U.C. Regents' Resolution to
Eliminate Affirmative Action: An Admissions Policy Survey and Proposal, 18 CHICANO-LATINO
L. REV. 150 (1996) (situating within larger trends away from affirmative action the decision of
the Board of Regents at the University of California to eliminate affirmative action from their
admissions policy); Jeffrey B. Wolff, Affirmative Action in College and Graduate School
Admissions-The Effects of Hopwood and the Actions of the U. C. Board of Regents on Its Continued
Existence, 50 SMU L. REV. 627 (1997) (discussing the history of affirmative action in higher
education from Bakke to Hopwood and Prop. 209).
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At the same time, minorities are still underrepresented in many
jobs of power and influence.7 For example, 1995 statistics show that
African Americans held only 2.5% of executive and management jobs
in the private sector.8 Only 2.4% of corporate lawyers in 1996 were
African American, with the percentage of African American partners
even lower at just over 1%.'
The racial and gender inequalities that exist in certain key careers
demonstrate what is possibly a larger discrimination somewhere in the
educational or occupational system."° Proponents of affirmative action
give one answer as to the source of racial and gender differences in
employment figures, namely, that discrimination against minorities
has perpetuated and reinforced prejudices, often unconscious, that
prevent minorities from obtaining good educations and positions of
power and authority. Opponents of affirmative action respond that
while there may be a disparity between white male and minority
achievement, establishing a legal system by classifying individuals
differently violates fundamental principles of justice.1
This Article will look at this debate by examining the
relationship between affirmative action and law school enrollment.
Affirmative action can be defined as either setting aside a definite
number of spots in an incoming class for members of a particular
minority group or groups or as using race to give members of racial
minorities a "boost" over relatively similarly-situated students in the
majority. As will be seen, the latter is constitutional while the former
is not. This Article will be agnostic in its treatment of the two
alternatives, as the difference between the two is not greatly significant
7. At this year's Republican National Convention, Colin Powell endorsed maintaining
affirmative action programs for minorities in part by criticizing "affirmative action for lobbyists
who load our federal tax code with preferences for special interests." Richard L. Berke,
Republicans Open Convention Emphasizing Unity, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2000, at Al; Excerpts
From General Powell's Address to Republicans, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2000, at A18.
8. FEDERAL GLASS CEILING COMM'N, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, GOOD FOR BUSINESS:
MAKING FULL USE OF THE NATION'S CAPITAL 77 (1995). See also David B. Wilkins & G.
Mitu Gulati, Why Are There So Few Black Lawyers in Corporate Law Firms?, 84 CALIF. L. REV.
493,503 (1996).
9. Ann Davis, Big Jump in Minority Associates, But..., NAT'L L.J., Apr. 29, 1996, at 1.
10. Amy P. Maloney suggests that one way to increase enrollment of women and minorities
in law school is for law schools to create more flexible time schedules, including part-time
education, to accommodate students who have taken "nontraditional" paths to law school. See
Amy P. Maloney, Note, Flexible Academic Programs in Legal Education: Diversifying Our Law
Schools by Creating Opportunities for Nontraditional Students, 67 UMKC L. REV. 165, 168, 175
(1998).
11. For a brief overview of arguments for and against affirmative action in educational
settings and the legal framework into which these arguments fit, see generally Constance Hawke,
Refraining the Rationale for Affirmative Action in Higher Education Admissions Decisions, 135
EDUC. L. REP., Aug. 1999, at 1.
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for purposes of this Article, though it is something that would need to
be decided at some point. The difference between the two positions
turns on the standard of review for determining the constitutionality
of affirmative action programs. Increasingly, courts are imposing
higher standards of review on affirmative action programs, even those
that purport only to give minorities assistance in, and not guarantees
of, admission. This will become clearer in this Article's later
discussion of relevant case history. In practice, there may not be much
difference between the two approaches, as any "boost" can, in effect,
become a guaranteed pass if given enough weight. This is an
important debate, but not one this Article will touch.
This Article will view the relationship between affirmative action
and law school admissions through the lens of The Bell Curve, 2 a book
suggesting that a genetic link probably exists between race and
intelligence.13 In The Bell Curve, Charles Murray and Richard J.
Herrnstein conduct a statistical analysis on a variety of aptitude tests
and other measures of intelligence, concluding that blacks and whites
do differ on standardized tests of cognitive ability, even when
controlling for such factors as motivation and socioeconomic status. 4
Indeed, much of the book is geared toward discounting environmental
explanations of intelligence scores. The relevancy that The Bell Curve
has to the affirmative action debate is in the ways that arguments for
and against affirmative action must be altered when faced with
divergent assumptions about genetic differences in human
intelligence. The theoretical arguments derived from the thought
experiment in viewing affirmative action in light of varying posited
levels of intellectual ability are not important, because this Article
expects people to be convinced that there are in fact genetic differences
in intelligence. The author hopes, however, that no one believes there
are such differences.'" Rather, engaging in the thought experiment of
assuming The Bell Curve to be true allows one to understand not only
12. RICHARD J. HERRNSTEIN & CHARLES MURRAY, THE BELL CURVE: INTELLIGENCE
AND CLASS STRUCTURE IN AMERICAN LIFE (1994).
13. Herrnstein and Murray do not claim that all racial differences in intelligence are due to
genetics, but they do give it a central role: "It seems highly likely to us that both genes and the
environment have something to do with racial differences." Id. at 311. Furthermore, these
differences correspond to a history of race relations in the United States: "A substantial
difference in cognitive ability distributions separates whites from blacks, and a smaller one
separates East Asians from whites. These differences play out in public and private life." Id. at
315. Lest the conviction of their assertion be questioned, Herrnstein and Murray spend almost
all of the 47 pages of Chapter 13 ("Ethnic Differences in Cognitive Ability") refuting
explanations of differences in IQ scores as due to factors other than race.
14. Id. at 276, 282-83, 286.
15. For those who do believe in such differences, and there undoubtedly are some, this
Article's arguments gain added relevancy.
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the core principles of the arguments for and against affirmative action,
but also any inconsistencies that may exist in these principles.
I. LAW SCHOOL STUDENTS AS REPRESENTATIVE OF THE
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION DEBATE
There are several reasons why law school enrollment can be a
reasonable proxy for the state of the affirmative action debate in this
country today. Before listing the reasons for its choice of law school
students, this Article underscores the generalizability of the principles
discussed in relation to law students and other beneficiaries of
affirmative action. Although this Article provides statistics to frame
the issue, it is not meant to be a systematic statistical study of
affirmative action. 16 Rather, it is primarily interested in exploring the
theoretical underpinnings of the different sides of the affirmative
action debate. These underlying principles certainly apply to law
school, but, as will be seen, they can easily be extended to other forms
of affirmative action as well. 7 Focusing on one particular example of
affirmative action, though, provides a hook that helps focus the
discussion. With that having been said, the following are reasons why
law students provide a particularly appropriate category for framing
the affirmative action debate:
1. Admission to law school emphasizes the importance of merit
more than college because of the selectivity of law school admissions
and the relatively small number of spots available. There are selective
undergraduate institutions, yet the most selective undergraduate
institutions are still not as selective as the most selective law schools.' 8
16. For an example of such a study, see Susan Welch & John Gruhl, Does Bakke Matter?
Affirmative Action and Minority Enrollments in Medical and Law Schools, 59 OHIO ST. L. J. 697
(1998). Welch and Gruhl conducted a study of minority enrollment in 1975 (prior to Bakke),
1983 (soon after Bakke), and in 1995, concluding that minority enrollment was affected little by
the Supreme Court decision outlawing explicit quotas. See id. at 710. Indeed, the biggest effect
of Bakke was that it "solidified the existing practice of affirmative action in admissions." Id. at
721. This article is a condensed version of SUSAN WELCH & JOHN GRUHL, AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION AND MINORITY ENROLLMENTS IN MEDICAL AND LAW SCHOOLS (1998).
17. This is certainly true for affirmative action in other educational settings. One may
contend that there is a difference between affirmative action in educational settings and that with
regard to employment. The difference lies in some people's feeling that the arguments for merit
are more pressing in the employment setting than in the school admission setting. The reasons
for this, however, are not entirely clear.
18. For example, the top three ranked law schools (Yale, Stanford, and Harvard) have
acceptance rates of 8.7%, 12.4%, and 14.7% respectively. For their college counterparts (Cal
Tech, Harvard, and MIT), these figures are 18%, 12%, and 22% respectively. These figures are
somewhat misleading because of the self-selectivity in applying to universities specializing in
technology. Hence, a better indicator might be liberal arts colleges, where the top three ranked
schools (Swarthmore, Amherst, and Williams) have acceptance rates of 19%, 23%, and 26%
respectively. All statistics are from U.S. News & World Report, Annual Survey of the Best
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Furthermore, there are far more relatively unselective undergraduate
institutions than there are unselective law schools.19 Consequently,
those who attend law school or obtain some other graduate degree can
generally be considered to be of at least moderate intelligence and,
thus, to have achieved their position through their intellectual skill and
merit.2°
2. Though it is by no means a prerequisite for success, few
would disagree that a law degree is more of an indicator of academic
achievement and future prominence than college education alone.
Since much of the debate about affirmative action is about placing
people in positions of power and influence, the arguments in favor of
affirmative action are perhaps strongest when the beneficiaries can use
their position to correct the injustices and discrepancies that created
the need for affirmative action in the first place. Having a law degree
is a good indicator that one will attain a position of power and
influence,21 either through wealth 22 or through community service of
some sort.23
Colleges and Graduate Schools (last visited July 27, 2000) <http://www.usnews.com/usnews/
edu/college/corank.htm>.
19. There are over 1300 undergraduate institutions in the United States, but only 184 law
schools. The U.S. News & World Report Annual College Survey included 1323 schools but did
not include junior colleges or trade schools. U.S. News & World Report, Annual College Survey
(last visited July 27, 2000) <http://www.usnews.com/usnews/edu/college/rankings/
collmeth.htm>. The figure for the number of law schools comes from the ABA website, as U.S.
News & World Report lists only 174 law schools. American Bar Association, Approved Law
Schools (last visited July 27, 2000) <http://www.abanet.org/legaled/approvedlawschools/
approved.html>. To be sure, only a small percentage of college graduates even have the desire to
go to law school, but this can be counterbalanced by the self-selection process that takes place
among some students who might otherwise want to go to law school but choose not to apply,
feeling that they do not possess the requisite level of education to be admitted.
20. This is not to suggest that those without post-college education are uniformly
unintelligent. Rather, graduate education can be viewed as an indicator of intelligence, whereas
there are no clear indicators of intelligence for those without such education.
21. The Minorities Interested in Legal Education group, part of the Law School
Admissions Council (affiliated with the LSAT) claims that no racial group comprises more than
4% of lawyers in America. Law School Admissions Council, Minorities in Legal Education (last
visited July 27, 2000) <http://www.lsac.org/minorities-in-legal-education.htm>.
22. The median income for full-time, year-round workers in 1997 was $35,248 for men and
$26,029 for women ($25,212 for men and $13,703 for women when not controlling for
employment status); for equity partners in a law firm (of any size), the median income in 1997
was $200,944 (not controlling for sex). U.S. Census Bureau, Historical Income Tables-People,
Table P-36: Full-Time, Year-Round Workers (All Races) by Median Income and Sex: 1970-1997
(last visited Sep. 29, 2000) <http//:www.census.gov/hhes/income/histinc/p36.html>; U.S.
Census Bureau, Historical Income Tables-People, Table P-8: Age-People (All Races) by Median
Income and Sex: 1947 to 1998 (last visited Sep. 29, 2000) <http//:www.census.gov/hhes/
income/histinc/p08.html>; ALTMAN WEIL, INC., SURVEY OF LAW FIRM ECONOMICS (1999).
23. Despite the fact that being a lawyer is likely the most publicly ridiculed occupation in
the United States, a large percentage of members of Congress hold a law degree. Though a
dramatic decline from the percentage (90%) of members of Congress who were lawyers at the
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3. Examining law students provides more reliable statistics than
examining legal professionals. Law students enter a wide variety of
occupations upon graduation. An increasing number of students are
entering business fields that escape statistics gathered on legal
professionals.24 However, it is a virtual certainty that practicing
lawyers attended law school at some point.25
4. Temporal dynamics suggest that studying law students as
opposed to legal professionals provides a better appreciation of both
the effects of and the current need for affirmative action. Looking at
the figures for minority26 representation among current lawyers, one
could argue that the existing disparities can be explained by the fact
that many lawyers obtained their legal degrees years ago, before the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 and other legal reforms had time to take
effect. Indeed, one of the common refrains among opponents is that,
regardless of whether affirmative action was ever appropriate, its time
has passed.2 ' Looking at current enrollment figures not only
circumvents the argument that there is a delayed reaction to the
effectiveness of affirmative action; it also provides a contemporary
perspective on whether affirmative action is still necessary.
5. Law school admissions supply a large enough applicant pool
to be statistically significant. 2' Furthermore, because the number of
beginning of the century, 40% of the members of the current Congress were lawyers at one time
prior to being elected. Jenny Brook Condon, A Tale of Two Congresses, ROLL CALL, Jan. 18,
1999. The numbers are somewhat lower for state legislatures (22% in New York and 15% in
California), but they still show that a law degree can definitely be considered a path to political
success. Richard Perez-Pena, Making Law vs. Making Money: Lawyers Abandon Legislatures for
Greener Pastures, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 1999, at 4:3.
24. See David Leonhardt & Brian D. Gale, Battle of the Graduate Schools: Law Gains Edge
on Business, and No One Knows Why, N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 2000, at Cl.
25. There are a few states, such as California, that allow people who did not attend an
accredited three-year law school to take the bar. It is not necessary for purposes of this article to
research the number of current lawyers who took this path, as the figure must be exceedingly
small.
26. The term "minority" as used in this Article refers to all non-white racial groups.
Because of the prevailing sense that affirmative action deals with race and not gender, this Article
does not include women in the category of minorities. See text accompanying note 161. Between
the different racial groups, this Article refers to Caucasians as "whites," as the term appears to be
a commonly accepted appellation. This Article uses the term "African Americans" instead of
"blacks" because of the negative connotations occasionally associated with the latter term,
though this article does occasionally use the term "blacks" when discussing historical cases to
convey prevailing usage and attitudes at the time. This article uses the term "Hispanics," despite
its increasingly infrequent use in mainstream literature, to avoid the gender connotations of the
term "Latinos." The other racial categorizations used here are "Asian Americans," which
encompasses descendants of all Asian nationalities, and "Native Americans."
27. For a representative presentation of this and other arguments against affirmative action,
see generally CLINT BOLICK, TRANSFORMATION: THE PROMISE AND POLITICS OF
EMPOWERMENT (1998).
28. In other words, there are enough students in the sample size that the addition or
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law school applications appears to be on the rise, as opposed to
business school applications, the debate between admission based on
affirmative action and admission based on merit could become
increasingly heated.
6. Although by no means the most important reason, many of
the major cases on affirmative action in the educational context focus
on law schools.
II. THE LEGAL HISTORY OF AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION AND EDUCATION
Before examining the relation between law school enrollment
figures and the principles underlying affirmative action, a summary of
the key cases in the Supreme Court affirmative action jurisprudence
and some lower court decisions on the topic will be helpful. There are
two purposes for presenting this history. The first is to provide a
background to the current affirmative action doctrine. Some of the
themes in the case law will recur later in this Article's more theoretical
analysis of the motivations for and against affirmative action in
relation to The Bell Curve. The second purpose is to show, by
examining some lower court opinions, that the debate over the future
of affirmative action, at least in an educational setting, is not settled.
The uncertainty over the future of affirmative action makes the
theoretical arguments that follow pressing.
This Article will not include voting rights cases, as they
primarily address access to government and not relations between
semipublic entities (like businesses or schools) and those against
whom such entities might otherwise discriminate. For similar reasons,
this Article will not explore race cases addressing jury composition.
Rather, the focus here is on the line of cases addressing the issue of
when government actors or private actors under government
regulation may consider race in deciding whom to employ or include
as students. This history section, which is, in effect, a narration of the
judicial treatment of race relations in this country, begins with the
Supreme Court's ruminations over segregation.
The Court infamously legalized segregation in Plessy v.
Ferguson3" by upholding a Louisiana law that required separate
railroad accommodations for white and colored passengers. Plessy, by
subtraction of a small number of members of a minority classification will not drastically alter
calculation of percentage representation. Thus, there is confidence that the results are accurately
representative of the desired measurement.
29. See Leonhardt & Gale, supra note 24.
30. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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codifying segregation,31 provided the basis against which most of the
subsequent cases on race relations and affirmative action have reacted.
Writing for the majority, Justice Brown opined that laws requiring
separation in order to prevent contact between the races do not imply
that one race is inferior to the other. 32 Political equality, which Justice
Brown was willing to grant blacks possessed, even though he must
have known that, in practice, this was far from true, is not the same
thing as requiring separation in schools and theaters and so on.33 Any
perceived inferiority, Justice Brown argued, is based on the
construction that those affected by the law place on it, and legislation
cannot eliminate such differences.34
In a dissent, Justice Harlan took more of a political realism
approach by acknowledging that the purpose of the law was not to
exclude whites from cars carrying blacks, but rather to exclude blacks
from cars carrying whites.3" The law, therefore, enforced white
superiority in the state. 36 Because the futures of the two races, Justice
Harlan contended, are "indissolubly linked together," the government
should not be allowed to establish laws that sow the "seeds of race
hate. ' 37 The idea that the races must be separated from one another
necessarily implies that one of the races is inferior. 38 This led Justice
Harlan to make his famous assertion that the Constitution is"colorblind. ' 39 This language has been invoked repeatedly ever since.
The next case of importance is Sweatt v. Painter,4" in which the
Court held that a law school established by the State of Texas for
blacks was not sufficiently equal to the law school at the University of
Texas to justify the latter institution's decision to deny admission to
black applicants.41 Sweatt shows cracks in Plessy's framework. There,
Heman Sweatt had been denied admission to the University of Texas
31. Id. at 543 ("A statute which implies merely a legal distinction between the white and
colored races... has no tendency to destroy the legal equality of the two races, or to reestablish a
state of involuntary servitude.").
32. Id. at 544. Justice Brown interestingly drew upon the example of segregated schools to
show that legal distinctions made on the basis of race are acceptable.
33. See id. at 545.
34. See id. at 550-52.
35. See id. at 557.
36. See id. at 557, 563-64.
37. Id. at 560. Because of this, Justice Harlan asserted that the Supreme Court's decision in
Plessy would be as "pernicious" as its decision in Dred Scott. Id. at 559. This point will be
discussed later in this Article.
38. See id. at 562.
39. Id. at 559. It must be noted that Justice Harlan qualified this assertion with the claim
that whites are now and will always remain the dominant race in the country.
40. 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
41. Id. at 635-36.
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law school solely because he was black. Despite the assertions of
equality in state institutions, the Court concluded:
[W]e cannot find substantial equality in the educational
opportunities offered white and Negro law students by the State.
In terms of number of the faculty, variety of courses and
opportunity for specialization, size of the student body, scope of
the library, availability of law review and similar activities, the
University of Texas Law School is superior. What is more
important, the University of Texas Law School possesses to a far
greater degree those qualities which are incapable of objective
measurement but which make for greatness in a law school.
Such qualities, to name but a few, include reputation of the
faculty, experience of the administration, position and influence
of the alumni, standing in the community, traditions and
prestige. It is difficult to believe that one who had a free choice
between these law schools would consider the question close.43
The issue in Sweatt was whether the alternative school for blacks
provided a comparable education to that received by white students at
the University of Texas Law School. If not, the Equal Protection
Clause, which requires equal treatment of all United States citizens,44
could be invoked to strike down this particular scheme. As the above
passage demonstrates, it would be virtually impossible for law schools
to maintain segregation and still provide comparable education to
students of different races. Thus, the mere existence of separate
schools for members of different racial groups would not satisfy the
Equal Protection Clause if the education received and the
opportunities created at the two schools were not equal.45
Theoretically, though, Sweatt leaves intact the "separate but equal"
doctrine established by Plessy,46 assuming the two law schools could be
completely equalized.
The "separate but equal" doctrine was finally ruled
unconstitutional in Brown v. Board of Education.47 Brown involved
African American minors who were denied admission to "white"
42. Id. at 631.
43. Id. at 633-34.
44. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The clause does not specifically mention race, but
given that the amendment was passed in 1868, soon after the end of the Civil War, it was clearly
meant to cover, at the very least, race. Indeed, the Fourteenth Amendment is the most
frequently invoked part of the Constitution in race cases.
45. Seeid. at 635.
46. The phrase is from the first sentence of Justice Harlan's dissent, Plessy, 163 U.S. at 552
(Harlan, J., dissenting), the only place it appears in the combined opinions, and does not seem to
carry as much weight there as it would in later uses of the concept.
47. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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Topeka schools on account of their race." The schools involved were
specifically chosen because they were substantially equal, forcing the
Court to rule on the "separate but equal" doctrine and not dodge the
issue as it arguably did in Sweatt. Because the schools at issue were
tangibly the same, the Court looked "instead to the effect of
segregation itself on public education."49  In an opinion written by
Chief Justice Warren, the Court held that segregated schools could
not be "separate but equal" because of the social stigma necessarily
attached to the different schools."0 One purpose of education is to
inculcate cultural values in the students by providing them with "the
very foundation of good citizenship.""1  Separating students on the
basis of race necessarily engenders feelings of inferiority, which affects
students' learning abilities by dampening their motivation and
damaging their "hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be
undone." 2 Consequently, the Court held, "separate but equal" has no
place in public education, and the opportunity for black students to
attend "white" schools must be guaranteed on equal protection
grounds. 3 As a result of Brown, many schools were forced to integrate
their populations,54 often creating tense racial confrontations.5 The
prohibition of segregation was soon extended beyond the educational
context to other areas, including restaurants,5 6  public
accommodations,57 and interracial marriages. 8
48. Id. at 486. The case was actually a consolidation of cases from Kansas, South Carolina,
Virginia, and Delaware.
49. Id. at 492.
50. Id. at 494-95.
51. Id. at 493.
52. Id. at 494. The Court cited various psychological studies in support of this proposition.
53. See id. at 495.
54. Some fear that contemporary emphasis on multiculturalism in society, and to some
extent multiculturalism in the law, is leading to a de facto re-segregation of different ethnic
groups who advance the ends of separatism through claims of autonomy. See generally J. Harvie
Wilkinson III, The Law of Civil Rights and the Dangers of Separatism in Multicultural America, 47
STAN. L. REV. 993 (1995) (discussing recent temptations and trends toward separatism in
politics, entitlements, education, and speech).
55. See generally DAVID J. ARMOR, FORCED JUSTICE: SCHOOL DESEGREGATION AND
THE LAW (1995); HARRY S. ASHMORE, HEARTS AND MINDS: THE ANATOMY OF RACISM
FROM ROOSEVELT TO REAGAN (1982); JEFFREY A. RAFFEL, HISTORICAL DICTIONARY OF
SCHOOL SEGREGATION AND DESEGREGATION: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE (1998); MARK
WHITMAN, THE IRONY OF DESEGREGATION LAW 1955-1995 (1998).
56. Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (upholding the power of Congress to
prohibit discrimination by restaurants through use of the Commerce Clause).
57. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (upholding the
power of Congress to prohibit discrimination by motels and other public accommodations on the
basis of the Commerce Clause).
58. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (finding a Virginia law prohibiting interracial
marriage to be a violation of the Equal Protection Clause); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184
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After striking down segregation and other discriminatory laws
and practices, the Court turned its attention to the affirmative action
issue, with which it still struggles today.s9 The landmark case in
education was Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, decided
in 1978.60 Allan Bakke, a white male, applied and was denied
admission to the University of Davis Medical School in 1973 and
again in 1974.61 His discrimination claim was based upon that fact
that he had a higher GPA and higher test scores than certain African
American, Mexican American, and Asian American students
admitted to the school through a special set-aside admissions
program." Justice Powell announced the judgment of the Court, but
was unable to get any other Justice to concur with the entirety of his
opinion. Justice Powell was able to get four Justices (Brennan, White,
Marshall, and Blackmun) to support the proposition that race could be
used as a factor in admissions.63 However, Powell did not want to go
so far as to say that race could be used as an absolute determinant of
admissions, as would exist in a quota system.64 To this extent, Justice
Powell agreed with the other four Justices on the Court (Burger,
Stevens, Rehnquist, and Stewart). 6' The result is the perhaps
confusing holding that race can be used as a factor in determining
admissions, but not as a necessary qualification.66
In writing what was essentially a compromise plurality opinion,
Justice Powell acknowledged the complexities of the affirmative action
debate. After summarizing both the long history of racism in the
United States and the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on race, Powell
(1964) (finding unconstitutional a Florida law prohibiting the cohabitation of interracial married
couples).
59. Alexandra Natapoff argues that the Supreme Court is stuck in a black/white dichotomy
in its treatment of cases dealing with race and that it needs to embrace Madisonian ideals of
plurality in dealing with contemporary multicultural reality to create a legal regime that is
sensitive to the diverse history, needs, and claims of different racial groups. See Alexandra
Natapoff, Trouble in Paradise: Equal Protection and the Dilemma of Interminority Group Conflict,
47 STAN. L. REV. 1059, 1060-65 (1995).
60. 438 U.S. 265 (1978). Previously, in DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974), a white
applicant sued on his own behalf after failing to gain admission to the University of Washington
Law School. However, the Supreme Court dismissed the case as moot because Mr. DeFunis had
been granted admission on the basis of a state court decision. For further discussion of DeFunis,
see Ronald Dworkin, The DeFunis Case: The Right to Go to Law School, in AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION: SOCIAL JUSTICE OR REVERSE DISCRIMINATION? 70-89 (Francis J. Beckwith &
Todd E. Jones eds., 1997).
61. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 276.
62. Id. at 278.
63. See id. at 324-25 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
64. Id. at 307.
65. See id. at 408, 416 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
66. Id. at 317-18.
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rejected the medical school's argument that racial minorities merit
special protection not afforded to the white majority. 67 Indeed, the
very idea of giving preference to a particular racial group conflicts with
our current sense of justice defined as equality.68 Furthermore, "it
may not always be clear that a so-called preference is in fact benign. ''69
Allowing preference to be used to differentiate between races creates a
tension between individual and group goals. "Courts may be asked to
validate burdens imposed upon individual members of a particular
group in order to advance the group's general interest. '7  This result,
privileging a group over an individual, is something the Constitution
does not allow, especially where the individuals bearing the burden
did not perpetuate the harm.7' Separating individuals on the basis of
race may also perpetuate negative stereotypes.7 2  Despite these
concerns, however, Justice Powell did find a limited form of
affirmative action constitutional.
Justice Powell's position on acceptable uses of affirmative action
comes across in his rejection of several of the arguments forwarded by
the University of California. Powell rejected as facially invalid the
explicit allocation of admission slots according to specific
percentages. 3  He contended that explicit quotas violate the
Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause because such quotas
treat individuals differently explicitly on the basis of race 4.7  Thus,
67. See id. at 294-95. Arguing for the University, Archibald Cox contended that
affirmative action must be viewed in the larger context of discrimination against minorities. In
response to Justice Potter Stewart's question about whether or not the quota at U.C. Davis put a
limit on the number of whites admitted, Cox replied:
I think that it limited the number of nonminority, and therefore essentially white, yes.
But there are two things to be said about that: one is that this was not pointing the
finger at a group which had been marked as inferior in any sense and it was
undifferentiated, it operated against a wide variety of people. So I think it was not
stigmatizing....
Oral argument to Regents v. Bakke, in MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT... : TRANSCRIPTS OF 23
LIVE RECORDINGS OF LANDMARK CASES ARGUED BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT, at 307-08
(Peter Irons & Stephanie Guitton eds., 1993).
68. In this sense, Justice Powell adopted Justice Harlan's view of the Constitution as"colorblind":
The Equal Protection Clause is not framed in terms of 'stigma.' Certainly the word has no
clearly defined constitutional meaning. It reflects a subjective judgment that is standardless.
All state-imposed classifications that rearrange burdens and benefits on the basis of race are
likely to be viewed with deep resentment by the individuals burdened.
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 295 n.34.




73. See id. at 307.
74. Id. at 319.
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Powell aimed to ensure rights as an individual-based category. While
Powell allowed for the possibility of taking race into account in order
"to promote a substantial state interest,, 75 this exception is still
phrased in terms of the individual. In short, there can be no
recognition of the type of group-based rights that would fit well with
an analysis of programs like affirmative action unless they are always
linked to a specific harm that can be attached to an individual
perpetrator or victim.
It should be pointed out that this is the issue on which Justices
Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun disagreed with Justice
Powell. In an opinion written by Justice Brennan, 76 concurring in part
and dissenting in part, the four Justices argued that Congress intended
Title VI to imply that race can be taken into account and racial quotas
used when they remedy disadvantages caused by past racial prejudice
but not when they demean or insult a racial group.77 Congress
intended that laws concerning discrimination not be static and
permanently fixed but rather that they "be shaped by experience,
administrative necessity, and evolving judicial doctrine. '7' This
allows universities to address existing discrimination as it is actually
manifest rather than through a more abstract theoretical treatment of
racism. 71 Such a policy would be allowed even if the institution did
not itself have a past history of discrimination."0 Remedial programs,
the four concurring Justices maintained, must undergo strict scrutiny
and must be careful not to burden with a benign program those least
able to handle it."1 In their eyes, the Davis program satisfied this
requirement. 2 It is not necessary for those benefited to show that they
were individually harmed by past discrimination; rather, they need
only show that they belong to a general class that has likely suffered
from past discrimination by demonstrating disparate racial impact.8 3
In essence, the concurrence written by Brennan values the group over
the individual.8 4 In his emphasis on individual rights, however,
75. Id. at 320.
76. Justices White, Marshall, and Blackmun also wrote separate concurring opinions. It
would bring in inordinate detail to discuss these opinions individually other than to mention
Marshall's stringent emphasis on the history of racial discrimination against blacks as a
justification for present remedial programs. See id. at 400-01.
77. See id. at 330.
78. Id. at 337.
79. See id. at 338-39.
80. See id. at 344.
81. See id. at 357.
82. See id. at 362, 369-76.
83. See id. at 366, 369.
84. Charles R. Lawrence argues that because race is socially constructed, remedies to racial
conflict are best viewed in terms of groups instead of individuals and individual rights, the latter
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Powell rejected this line of argument as transgressing the boundaries
of a colorblind Constitution. 85
In response to the medical school's second argument, Powell left
open the possibility that affirmative action is permissible to remedy
past wrongs, but only upon a showing of those past wrongs, of which
he found none.8" Similarly, Powell rejected the University of
California's contention that admitting minority students would
increase the delivery of health care to "underserved" communities
because the University offered insufficient evidence to support that
proposition.87
Powell did accept, however, the fourth argument for affirmative
action, namely, that affirmative action can be used to create a "diverse
student body."88 On First Amendment freedom of speech grounds,
Powell found this principle to be constitutional. Institutions of higher
education "must be accorded the right to select those students who
will contribute the most to the 'robust exchange of ideas."' 89 It is not
necessary to set aside a specific number of seats in order to achieve
racial diversity.9" Rather, race can be used as one factor among many
in the admissions process.9 1 It is thus neither a bar to admission nor
an automatic pass. Such a program "treats each applicant as an
individual in the admissions process" because one's race becomes a
being a common focus even of critics of affirmative action. Charles R. Lawrence III, Fonard:
Race, Multiculturalism, and the Jurisprudence of Transformation, 47 STAN. L. REV. 819, 824-25,
835 (1995).
85. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 296 n.36, 308 n.44.
86. See id. at 307-09.
87. Id.at310-11.
88. Id. at 311. There is some resonance to this idea. After all, we would probably not
accept, at least from a legal standpoint, setting aside specific scholarships or lowering admissions
standards for athletes (it does not matter which) for the purpose of fostering winning football
teams, but we might accept this practice from a diversity standpoint (athletes presumed to bring
a different perspective than nonathletes). Similarly, colleges can admit skilled musicians on the
basis of increasing the cultural experience of its students. If athletic and musical ability can serve
as diversity justifications for admissions, then it is unclear why a diversity justification cannot be
extended to racial categories as well. Cox noted the similarity between athletic and racial
scholarships in his oral argument in Bakke. See Oral arguments to Regents v. Bakke, supra note
67, at 308-09.
89. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 313.
90. Seeid. at315.
91. See id. at 316-17. Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun argued that there
is no meaningful or constitutional distinction between preferences and quotas for admissions
because the former could be turned in essence into the latter depending on how much weight was
given to one's race. See id. at 378.
In an opinion also both concurring and dissenting in part, Justices Stevens, Burger, Stewart,
and Rehnquist asserted that the case was not a class action, so the issue of race should not have
been raised. See id. at 408, 411. Despite this admonition, though, the opinion does go on to
assert that Title VI was meant to reinforce a colorblind Constitution. See id. at 416.
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component of his or her individual merit in being admitted to the
school.92 This compromise between the use of racial quotas and the
complete exclusion of race from admissions decisions maintains a
regime of individual rights, while incorporating key elements of group
identity by accepting diversity of opinions as a means of admission.93
Bakke was a watershed case regarding affirmative action in
educational settings. The cases following Bakke arguably represent a
move by the Court away from allowing race to be used as a factor in
the selection process. Most Supreme Court affirmative action cases
subsequent to Bakke have dealt with affirmative action in the
workplace.94 The Court in Richmond v. Croson held that statistical
racial disparities cannot be used to establish a prima facie practice of
discrimination when special qualifications are required to fill the job in
question.95 The Croson Court further held that mandatory set-asides
for government-funded projects must be based upon a showing that
the city was a "passive participant" in past discrimination in order to
justify the proposed remedial action. Assuming this burden is met,
the program must be narrowly tailored to remedy the demonstrated
harm.97  This holding exists for both federal and state funding
projects.9" Justice Powell, the author of the plurality opinion in Bakke,
somewhat disturbingly concluded in his plurality opinion in Wygant
92. Id. at 318.
93. Admitting that one's race can lead to a diverse perspective is a clear example of the
ecological fallacy in imputing individual characteristics from group identity. The only way to
escape this fallacy is to hold that being a member of a particular racial group inevitably leads to a
particular set of life experiences, which is to rely upon groups as a meaningful political and legal
form of identity. In other words, unless Powell assumed that there are a particular set of
experiences to be gained from being a member of a particular group, usually a racial group but
not necessarily so, then there is no justification for making the link between race and diversity.
In the alternative, one could contend that the mere presence of people with the outward
appearance of being a member of a minority racial group will instill toleration and otherwise
dissolve prejudice in those who belong to the majority. In order to maintain the focus on the
individual, though, it is necessary to place an unsettling emphasis on appearance rather than
group characteristics. There is no evidence in Justice Powell's opinion that he follows either line
of reasoning.
94. For a brief overview of this case law, see generally Elizabeth Maier, A Review of Higher
Education Case Law, 4 RACE & ETHNIC ANCESTRY L.J. 54 (1998).
95. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 492 (1989).
96. Id. at 492.
97. See id. at 506-07.
98. This position is consistent with Justice Powell's decision in Bakke, because he
apparently would have been open to specific racial set-asides if they could be shown to remedy
past wrongs. No mention was made in the funding projects at issue of using race as a
contributing factor for allocating work, though it is not clear why it could not be so used.
However, for workplace affirmative action, the Supreme Court does appear to require a
demonstration of past wrongs. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
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v. Jackson Board of Education99 that the desire to have minority role
models for minority students did not bear a significant enough
relationship to remedying prior discriminatory hiring practices to
justify a program creating a minority preference in teacher layoffs.'0"'
On the other hand, in United Steelworkers v. Weber,1'0 the Court held
that a plan to reserve a certain number of spots in a factory training
program for blacks as a temporary measure until the percentage of
skilled black workers in the plant mirrored the percentage of black
workers in the labor force was constitutional." 2
In Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC,13 the Court gave deference
to Congress's decision to require the FCC to sell a certain number of
radio and television broadcasting licenses to minorities in order to
promote diversity. 104  This deference, however, was explicitly
overruled in Adarand Constructors, Inc v. Pena, in which the Court
held federal affirmative action programs to the same standard as that
applied to states and municipalities in Croson, following on the heels
of the other cases just discussed." 5 The decision in Adarand possibly
signals an entrenchment against affirmative action, though it does
allow for affirmative action when it is narrowly tailored to remedy past
wrongs. 06
It is unclear, however, the extent to which Croson and Adarand
extend to the educational context. 7 At issue is whether or not
justifications other than remedying past wrongs can still be applied to
school admissions. While Justice Powell's plurality opinion in Bakke
admitted diversity as an acceptable justification for considering race in
the admissions process, it is unclear if Justices Brennan, White,
Marshall and Blackmun agreed with it. In a footnote early in their
opinion, the four Justices stated that they agreed the "race as a factor"
99. 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
100. Id. at 275.
101. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
102. Id. at 208.
103. 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
104. Id. at 566.
105. 518 U.S. at 227.
106. See id. at 227, 235.
107. There is no justification for differentiating between affirmative action in the
educational and in the occupational context other than possibly a sense of degree as far as merit is
concerned. There is a prevailing sense that education is preparation for a job and that once the
job hunt begins, arguments of merit should reign supreme. This is an artificial distinction. The
line at which merit becomes of overriding importance, assuming one believes that this is ever the
case, can be drawn at any point in the process. In other words, it is as logically coherent to
endorse arguments of merit at the occupational level as it is at the graduate school level, as at the
college admissions level, as at the high school level. The only limiting factor is at what point one
believes distinctions based upon merit can in fact be made.
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plan is constitutional "at least so long as the use of race to achieve an
integrated student body is necessitated by the lingering effects of past
discrimination. '  While this seems to endorse a "past
discrimination" requirement, one could also interpret a lack of
diversity as a "lingering" effect of that past discrimination. 109
In United States v. Fordice,10° the Court suggested a possible
means for reinvigorating the combating of "lingering" effects as a
justification for affirmative action, challenging Mississippi's de facto
"dual" system of colleges and universities for blacks and whites, which
existed despite an ostensibly neutral admissions policy."' By viewing
the university system in Mississippi on broad terms, as opposed to
focusing more narrowly on identifying specific harms, the Court
allowed a more expansive justification of affirmative action.
If the State perpetuates policies and practices traceable to its
prior system that continue to have segregative effects-whether
by influencing student enrollment decisions or by fostering
segregation in other facets of the university system-and such
policies are without sound educational justification and can be
practicably eliminated, the State has not satisfied its burden of
proving that it has dismantled its prior system."
The Court suggested a willingness to look beyond admissions
standards to determine whether an institution of higher education is
acting discriminatorily."' Indeed, the mention of segregative effects
resulting from student enrollment decisions is entirely compatible
with a concern for diversity, though this motivation is not discussed in
Fordice. More important, though, is the acceptance that institutional
108. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 326 n.1.
109. As will be seen, the majority opinion in Hopwood v. Texas suggests that the four
Justices implicitly rejected Powell's "diversity" position. 78 F.3d 932, 944 (1996). To interpret
this passage in this way, though, leaves the four Justices in an untenable "all or nothing" stance
in which race can either be used as an exclusive criterion for admissions or it cannot be used at
all. While the four Justices may not have wanted to rely primarily upon a "diversity"
justification for racial admissions, there is nothing in their concurring opinion that contradicts
such an approach.
110. 505 U.S. 717 (1992).
111. Specifically, the Court looked at admissions standards, program duplication,
institutional mission assignments, and continued operation of all eight public universities.
For a historical follow-up to Fordice, see generally Robert A. Kronley & Claire V. Handley,
Notes from the Field: Higher Education Desegregation in Mississippi, in CHILLING ADMISSIONS:
THE AFFIRMATIVE ACTION CRISIS AND THE SEARCH FOR ALTERNATIVES 83 (Gary Orfield
& Edward Miller eds., 1998).
112. Fordice, 505 U.S. at 731.
113. It thus may be possible to use the Fordice decision to preserve historically black public
colleges and universities. See generally Frank Adams, Jr., Why Brown v. Board of Education and
Affirmative Action Can Save Historically Black Colleges and Universities, 47 ALA. L. REV. 481
(1996).
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racism cannot always be limited to specific actors but rather must
sometimes be viewed more systematically. This type of approach
addresses "the lingering effects of past discrimination" in a way that
would likely be quite agreeable to Brennan, White, Marshall, and
Blackmun. This approach, however, has not been adopted by later
courts.
III. RECENT LOWER COURT DECISIONS ON AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
IN EDUCATIONAL SETTINGS
Recent circuit court opinions have tended to emphasize
admissions standards as the primary concern for higher education and
race, shifting away from allowing affirmative action to operate within
those policies.114 In Podberesky v. Kirwan,' a scholarship at the
University of Maryland set aside solely for African Americans was
found unconstitutional because it was not narrowly tailored to remedy
past discrimination."6 More damaging for proponents of affirmative
action was the Third Circuit's rejection of various proffered
justifications for the affirmative action program: remedying a poor
reputation of the university among African Americans, 7 eliminating
a climate on campus hostile to African Americans, 18 and providing
minority role models. 9 As will be seen, these justifications for
affirmative action are among those offered in Section V.
Hopwood v. Texas"' took a more direct stance against affirmative
action in admissions policies with regard to the University of Texas
114. See generally Scott L. Olson, The Case Against Affirmative Action in the Admissions
Process, 58 U. PITT. L. REV. 991 (1997) (arguing that recent court decisions signal a trend away
from acceptance of affirmative action in admissions policies).
115. 38 F.3d 147 (3d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1128 (1995).
116. Id. at 158. The court proceeded to examine the attraction of only high-achieving
African American students, the inclusion of non-Maryland residents, the arbitrary reference
pool, and race-neutral alternatives as reasons why the program is not narrowly tailored. See also
Ellen R. Dassance, Affirmative Action Implications for Colleges and Universities Beyond the
Scholarship and Student Admissions Areas, 5 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 661, 673 (1997)
(suggesting that the principles behind the Fourth Circuit's decision to strike down a minority
scholarship in Podberesky could also be applied to faculty hiring decisions).
117. See id. at 154 (holding that allowing "mere knowledge of historical fact" to justify
affirmative action programs would provide a too broad and too easily satisfied justification).
118. See id. (noting a lack of a clear connection between past discrimination and current
attitudes).
119. See id. at 159 (extending Wygant).
120. 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1033 (1996) (denying certiorari to the
University of Texas School of Law). Upon remand, the district court found that the applicants
who challenged the admissions policies at the law school would not have been admitted anyway.
Hopwood v. Texas, 999 F. Supp. 872 (W.D. Tex. 1998), affd, 236 F.3d 256 (5th Cir. 2000).
The district court still decided to award the plaintiffs attorney's fees.
Samuel Issacharoff, a law professor and member of the defense team for the University of
Texas, asserts that the state had a compelling interest in promoting racial diversity in its law
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School of Law. Focusing on the solitary nature of Justice Powell's
opinion in Bakke, the court held his emphasis on diversity to be
nonbinding precedent because "no other Justice joined in that part of
the opinion discussing the diversity rationale. ' 121 Racial differences,
Judge Smith argued, were not an accurate predictor of diversity of
viewpoints, meaning that diversity could not constitute a compelling
state interest justifying the use of racial classifications in affirmative
action programs. 122  Indeed, after Croson and Adarand, the only
compelling justification for racial classifications was "remedying the
effects of racial discrimination.' ' 123 Judge Smith concluded that
using race, in and of itself, to choose students simply achieves a
student body that looks different. Such a criterion is no more
rational than choices based upon the physical size or blood type
of applicants .... To believe that a person's race controls his
point of view is to stereotype him. 24
The admissions policy at the law school, however, was unique
enough to call the generalizability of Hopwood into question. 25 More
specifically, the law school established different admissions standards
schools and that an affirmative action policy acknowledging the racial identity of the applicants,
as opposed to the race-neutral policy pushed by the courts, was necessary in order to achieve this
goal. See Samuel Issacharoff, Bakke in the Admissions Office and the Courts: Can Affirmative
Action Be Defended?, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 669, 680-82 (1998).
121. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 944.
122. Id. at 944-45.
123. Id. at 945.
124. Id. at 945-46. Judge Smith was correct, of course, about this last point, but, where
there is a high correlation between the stereotype and the actual viewpoint, it might be justifiable
to sacrifice the harm done to a small number of individuals through incorrect stereotyping for the
greater good created by having diverse viewpoints at the university. This Article's position is
premised upon there being at least some commonality, though by no means complete sameness,
among the experiences of African Americans and members of other racial groups. To quote
John Payton, a prominent proponent of affirmative action,
You can't take two kids-one black and one white-with parents who have the same
occupation and live in the same neighborhood, and say that they are interchangeable.
That's not how race works in our society. Race will affect them in different ways.
That's the jarring reality of our society. There is something different about the
experiences of a black student, a Hispanic student, an Asian student, or a white
student.... Do white students, black students, Asian students, and Hispanic
students contribute to a diverse student body? The answer is yes.
Tim Wells, Affirmative Action in Law School Admissions: Is It Necessary?-Interview with John
Payton and Clint Bolick, THE WASHINGTON LAWYER, Jan.-Feb. 2000.
125. For an extensive discussion of Hopwood, the cases leading up to and influencing it,
and the implications of Hopwood, see generally Laura C. Scanlan, Hopwood v. Texas: A
Backward Look at Affirmative Action in Education, 71 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1580 (1996); David
Schimmel, Is Bakke Good Law? The Fifth Circuit Says No and Outlaws Affirmative Action, 113
ED. L. REP. 1052 (1996); Victor V. Wright, Hopwood v. Texas: The Fifth Circuit Engages in
Suspect Compelling Interest Analysis in Striking Down an Affirmative Action Admissions Program,
34 HOUS. L. REV. 871 (1997).
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and review processes and committees for African American and
Mexican American applicants and for all other applicants. 126  This
resembles the policy that was struck down in Bakke more than the one
that was sustained. 127
Furthermore, when the State attempted to tie its admissions
policy to past discrimination, it based its analysis upon the history of
primary and secondary schools in Texas rather than upon the law
school alone, a move that the Fifth Circuit, drawing on Croson and
Wygant, rejected. 128 The court did not comment upon whether some
form of affirmative action would have been allowed had past
discrimination in the law school been demonstrated. 129  Thus,
narrowly interpreted, the Hopwood court held a particularly flawed
affirmative action program unconstitutional, not affirmative action in
general. 3 ' The narrow holding explains why the Supreme Court
131denied certiorari.
A situation similar to Hopwood arose in Wessmann v. Gittens.Y12
The case involved admission to the elite Boston Latin School, a public
school that based its admissions largely on the results of a
standardized exam.'33 The school had established a complicated
affirmative action program whereby half of the seats were reserved for
the highest scorers on the test and the other half of the seats were
126. See Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 936.
127. See Mark R. Killenbeck, Pushing Things Up to Their First Principles: Reflections on the
Values of Affirmative Action, 87 CALIF. L. REV. 1299, 1364-65 (1999) (asserting that it is
unlikely the University of Texas actually believed the law school admissions policy to be in
compliance with Bakke). Killenbeck later argues that if Texas had structured its minority
admissions policy in a more careful way, the policy would have been more likely to pass
constitutional muster. Id. at 1370.
128. See Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 950.
129. The Hopwood court mentioned in dicta that even if the entire statewide system of
public education were the proper unit of analysis, the law school admissions policy would not
withstand review. Id. at 951. In addition, the court argued, following Podberesky, that a bad
reputation cannot be corrected through an admissions program because the applicants have
already decided that they want to go to the law school, despite its allegedly bad reputation. Id. at
953. This, however, ignores the possibility that more minorities would choose to apply in the
first place if the admissions policy and reputation of the law school were different.
130. There is some contention that Hopwood and other recent cases are causing universities
to drop their affirmative action programs before even going to court. See Michael S. Greve, The
Demise of Race-Based Admissions Policies, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., Mar. 19, 1999, at B6.
131. In refusing certiorari on Hopwood v. Texas, Justices Ginsberg and Souter suggested
that the case should have been heard, because "[w]hether it is constitutional for a public college
or graduate school to use race or national origin as a factor in its admissions process is an issue of
great national importance." Texas v. Hopwood, 518 U.S. 1033, 1033 (1996). The two refused to
grant certiorari, though, because the rationale, and not the judgment, was challenged, and the
Court only reviews final judgments. Id.
132. 160 F.3d 790 (1st Cir. 1998).
133. Id. at 791.
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distributed to so as to reflect the racial composition of the qualified
applicant pool minus those students automatically admitted."' The
school claimed the policy was necessary to (1) maintain diversity and
(2) remedy past discrimination (the school had formerly been under a
court desegregation order) by countering the negative attitudes of
teachers toward minorities.13
The First Circuit rejected the first claim on the grounds that the
school was operating what was, in essence, a racial quota system, thus
invoking strict scrutiny, without providing any evidence that their
proportional admission policy was "in any way tied to the vigorous
exchange of ideas."' 36  The court rejected the second claim because
past findings of discrimination are insufficient to justify present race-
based action absent further quantifiable evidence and because the
remedy was not narrowly tailored, as it admitted not only those
students from public schools who had supposedly been harmed by low
teacher expectations but also students from private schools as well.'37
The arguments put forth by the majority may at first be
convincing, but they are adequately countered by the dissent. While
conceding that the diversity argument may not be a strong one, Judge
Lipez argued that the past discrimination argument can be sustained if
one interprets Wygant and Croson as requiring the school to provide
only a prima facie showing of discrimination and not the extensive
quantitative support that the majority requires."' Judge Lipez found
this prima facie case established by expert testimony, thereby
requiring the challengers of the affirmative action program to rebut
this presumption.'39 He also found the policy narrowly tailored
because it incorporated elements of flexibility and was necessary to
provide relief.40
134. Id. at 793. The qualified applicant pool consisted of those scoring in the top 50% on
the standardized admissions test. Id.
135. Id. at 797, 800.
136. Id. at 799.
137. See id. at 802, 805, 808.
138. See id. at 810, 814 (Lipez, J., dissenting).
139. See id. at 819-20; see also Note, First Circuit Holds that Public Exam School Policy that
uses Race as an Admissions Factor Offends the Equal Protection Clause-Wessmann v. Gittens, 160
F.3d 790 (1st Cir. 1998), 112 HARV. L. REV. 1789, 1792 (1999) (supporting this point).
140. Wessmann, 160 F.3d at 829-30 (Lipez, J., dissenting). In response to the charge that
the program was invalid because it admitted students who had not gone to public schools, Judge
Lipez responded that parents should not be punished for having decided previously to remove
their children from an unsupportive environment. Id. at 832. One could also respond that the
admissions policy was as narrowly tailored as possible without excluding outright private school
children from admission. In other words, if one wanted to restrict the corrective aspects of the
admissions policy, it would be necessary to exclude private school students from that admissions
pool, which would introduce even further complexity and complications into the admissions
program. The establishment of a qualified applicant pool may have salience for affirmative
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Judge Lipez introduced a further subtlety into his analysis when,
in response to the charge that the admissions program was interested
solely in diversity because it failed to reach a minority population
reflective of the public school system as a whole, he asserted that the
school was fully justified in establishing a minimum threshold of
qualification, with the goal of proportionality narrowly tailored to fit
that pool of applicants.141
In contrast to Podberesky, Hopwood, and Wessmann, however,
other recent federal cases have suggested new life for affirmative action
programs at colleges and universities. Just this past December, the
Ninth Circuit in Smith v. University of Washington Law School'42
determined Justice Powell's opinion allowing for a diversity
justification for affirmative action to be both the narrowest possible
interpretation of Bakke and also still good law.' 43 While the court
reasoned that the perception of minorities as victims of "societal
discrimination" was not sufficient to justify affirmative action,'44 a five
Justice majority in Bakke favored giving added weight to minorities
under a diversity rationale.' This position directly conflicts with that
of the Fifth Circuit in Hopwood.'46 About a week after the Ninth
Circuit decision, the Eastern District of Michigan, in Gratz v.
Bollinger,'47 also rejected Hopwood's conclusion that diversity could
not be used to justify racial classifications, reasoning that the Fifth
Circuit read too much into the silence on the issue of diversity by the
four Justices who would have allowed the university's quota system.
48
While the court "did not necessarily agree" with the Ninth Circuit
that Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke was "the narrowest footing
upon which a race-conscious decision making process could stand,"' 49
it did agree that diversity "constitutes a compelling governmental
interest in the context of higher education justifying the use of race as
one factor in the admissions process. ''' 5 Before diversity could be
action programs in the future.
141. See id. at 831.
142. 233 F.3d 1188 (9th Cir. 2000) (upholding the possibility of diversity-based affirmative
action, but striking it down in the present case as barred by state law).
143. Id. at 1200.
144. Id. at 1197.
145. Id. at 1199.
146. 78 F.3d 932, 944 (5th Cir. 1996).
147. 122 F. Supp. 2d 811, 820-21 (E.D. Mich. 2000).
148. Id. at 820-22.
149. Id. at 820 (quoting Smith, 233 F.3d at 1199).
150. Id. In a later decision, the same judge rejected the contention that the college's
admissions policies could be construed as a narrowly tailored means of remedying past
discrimination, in large part because the defendant-interveners introduced no evidence that
remedying past discrimination, as opposed to fostering diversity, was the underlying reason for
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used as a compelling state interest, though, the State had to show that
the creation of a diverse student body resulted in a better educational
environment, which the State did by presenting empirical studies
demonstrating that those students in the most racially and ethnically
diverse classroom settings exhibited "the greatest engagement in active
thinking processes, growth in intellectual engagement and motivation,
and growth in intellectual and academic skills."' 5' Furthermore, these
students were also better able to understand multiple perspectives,
appreciate common values, and deal with conflicts." 2 Because of the
social science evidence showing its benefits, the court was able to
conclude that "diversity is not a 'remedy."" 3 The court even went so
far as to distinguish educational settings from the job hiring context
that existed in Croson and Adarand:
This Court, however, is not convinced that what may be too
amorphous and ill-defined in other contexts, i.e., the
construction industry context, is also necessarily too amorphous
or ill-defined in the context of higher education. In this Court's
opinion, the fact that the University cannot articulate a set
number or percentage of minority students that would constitute
the requisite level of diversity does not, by itself, eliminate
diversity as a potentially compelling interest. 154
Consequently, the court accepted as constitutional the current
admissions policy at the University of Michigan College of Literature,
Science, and the Arts of giving added "points" to minorities on the
admissions scalels s A different judge in the Eastern District of
Michigan, on the other hand, recently rejected diversity as a
compelling state interest in a case involving admissions to the
University of Michigan Law School.' Though the court there
acknowledged the same evidence of educational benefits as cited in
Gratz v. Bollinger, Judge Friedman did not believe that there was a
the admissions policy. Gratz v. Bollinger, 135 F. Supp. 2d 790 (E.D. Mich. 2001).
151. Gratz, 122 F. Supp. 2d at 822 (quoting a report by Patricia Y. Gurin, Prof. of
Psychology and Interim Dean of the School of Literature, Sciences, and Arts).
152. Id. For a further overview of the empirical evidence necessary to demonstrate
educational benefits of affirmative action, encompassing both studies already conducted and
issues that still need to be researched, see generally Jonathan R. Alger, Unfinished Homework for
Universities: Making the Case for Affirmative Action, 54 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 73
(1998).
153. Gratz, 122 F. Supp. 2d at 824.
154. Id. at 823.
155. Id. at 831.
156. Grutter v. Bollinger, No. 97-CV-75928-DT 2001 WL 293196, (E.D. Mich. Mar. 27,
2001) (Friedman, Dist. J.).
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strong connection between racial diversity and viewpoint diversity.157
Furthermore, the existence of an "unfair playing field" did not justify
implementing an admissions system that made explicit use of racial
classifications."5 8 Given that different judges in the same district court
came to opposite conclusions on admissions policies at the same
university, it is almost certain that the Sixth Circuit will need to
resolve this contradiction.
The decisions in Smith and Gratz strongly suggest that there
may still be life for affirmative action programs, at least in educational
settings where colleges and universities can rely on the diversity
rationale articulated in Bakke. The conflict between these cases and
Hopwood and Podberesky makes it highly likely that the Supreme
Court will need to resolve this issue in the near future. As Judge
Wiener stated in his concurrence to Hopwood, "if Bakke is to be
declared dead, the Supreme Court, not a three-judge panel of a circuit
court, should make that pronouncement."1"9  While the diversity
rationale, at least as presented in Bakke, relies upon more of an
individual-rights foundation, as opposed to the group-based rights
framework that this Article advocates in its analysis of The Bell Curve,
the current affirmative action jurisprudence provides room for
theoretical debate about the purposes and effects of affirmative
action. 60  After presenting strong factual evidence of continuing
systematic disparities in law school admissions for minorities, this
Article will return to these theoretical arguments.
IV. STATISTICS ON RACE AND LAW SCHOOL ENROLLMENTS
Regardless of judicial precedent, there is an undeniable problem
with underrepresentation of racial minorities in institutions of higher
education like law school.' Recent statistics show African Americans
157. Id. at 24.
158. Id. at 44.
159. Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 963 (5th Cir. 1996) (Wiener, J., concurring).
160. Lest it be feared that the previous overview has been nothing more than a history
lesson, this Article will cite Supreme Court precedent where appropriate to support its
arguments. In short, this Article's emphasis on group rights over individual rights does not
defeat its claims.
161. One big caveat in this Article is that it addresses affirmative action solely in terms of
race and ignores gender almost completely. This is not because gender is unimportant. Rather,
race has captured, for whatever reason, most of the focus and heat in the debate over affirmative
action. This is perhaps because women are inescapably integrated into the daily lives of men,
whereas race is frequently a much more "discreet and insular" classification. Education statistics
for gender also vary greatly by field, making it harder to draw generalized conclusions about the
principles behind affirmative action. The gender issue is further complicated by the willingness
of the courts to accept the possibility that physical differences between men and women justify
different treatment, resulting in an intermediate scrutiny standard for gender classifications as
2001] 1111
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comprise just over 13% of the American population among those age
25-34 (see chart below), but receive under 7.5% of the law degrees,
resulting in an underrepresentation of 43% as a percentage of law
degrees in relation to their percentage of population. Hispanics suffer
even greater underrepresentation at over 58%.162 Non-Hispanic
opposed to the strict scrutiny standard applied to racial classifications. See, e.g., Michael M. v.
Superior Ct. of Sonoma County, 450 U.S. 464 (1981) (holding that a California law punishing
males but not females for statutory rape was not a violation of the Equal Protection Clause
because women bear a risk of pregnancy that men do not). In the education arena, these gender
classifications are rarely persuasive. See, e.g., Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S.
718 (1982) (holding that an all-female nursing school could not exclude men because to do so
would perpetuate the image of nursing as a profession only for women and because the school
could not show that admitting men would create an adverse learning environment for female
students); United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (holding that women must be admitted
into the Virginia Military Institute because there was no justifiable reason for believing that the
"adversative method" of training would be harmed by allowing women to participate). It would
be interesting and helpful to compare gender and race both in Supreme Court jurisprudence and
with regard to affirmative action in general, but such a comparison is beyond the scope of this
Article. To the extent that one believes that affirmative action can be justified as a means to
correct for the absence of minorities in a desired school or field, then the principles discussed
below with regard to race will apply to gender as well, especially in relation to many highly paid
occupations. For a further discussion of gender and affirmative action, though not focusing on
the educational context, see, among others, DEBORAH L. RHODE, SPEAKING OF SEX 163-71
(1997); Elizabeth Fox-Genovese, Women's Rights, Affirmative Action, and the Myth of
Individualism, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 338 (1986); Helen Norton, Affirmative Action as a
Women's Issue, 1995 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 373 (1995); Mary K. O'Melveny, Playing the "Gender"
Card: Affirmative Action and Working Women, 84 Ky. L.J. 863 (1996); Laura M. Padilla,
Intersectionality and Positionality: Situating Women of Color in the Affirmative Action Dialogue, 66
FORDHAM L. REV. 843 (1997); Sherry Bebitch Jeffe, Don't Count on the Chief Beneficiaries of
Affirmative Action to Rescue It, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 26, 1995, at M6; Daniel B. Wood, States' Bid
To Change Workplace Hire Laws Leaves Women Split, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Apr. 7,
1995, at 1.
Herrnstein and Murray barely discuss gender in The Bell Curve. There is a suggestion that
men, on average, have a slightly higher IQthan women but also more variation. HERRNSTEIN &
MURRAY, supra note 12, at 275. However, Herrnstein and Murray fail to make any connections
between this apparent similarity in intelligence and the underrepresentation of women in high-
paying occupations. They also fail to address why disparities exist between men and women in
the receipt of J.D.s. A recent survey showed that in 1996-1997, men received 22,548 J.D.s and
LL.B.s (combined) but women received only 17,531 of the same degrees. FRANK B. MORGAN,
U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC. NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, [E.D. TABS] DEGREES AND
OTHER AWARDS CONFERRED BY TITLE IV ELIGIBLE, DEGREE -GRANTING INSTITUTIONS:
1996-97 20 (1999). To put these statistics in perspective, more white males (17,851) received
law degrees than did women of all races combined (17,531). Id. This disparity reflects just as
poorly on the admission of minorities as it does on the admission of women. In fact, of the
dramatic increases in the numbers of women and minorities admitted to law school over the past
couple of decades, women have been by far the greater beneficiaries. See Robert L. Nelson, The
Futures of American Lawyers: A Demographic Profile of a Changing Profession in a Changing
Society, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 345, 378 (1994).
162. Because a Hispanic ethnicity is often thought to be more of a language than a racial
classification, self-reporting figures for Hispanics are potentially not as accurate as figures for the
other ethnic classifications discussed. This is by no means meant to disparage the discrimination
experienced by Hispanics.
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whites, on the other hand, comprise 68.4% of the American population
of 25 to 34 year-olds but receive 79.8% of the law degrees, resulting in
an overrepresentation of almost 17%. Asian Americans, sometimes
criticized as unnecessary beneficiaries of affirmative action, 163 are the
most overrepresented in the percentage of law degrees to percentage of
population at 35%. 164 Native Americans are the only ethnic category
with reasonably close proportional representation of law degrees.1 61
Race' Population Percent Number Percent Percent
25-35 Population' Law Law Changef
(x1000) b Degrees' Degrees by
Race'
White, 26,506 68.36 30,716 79.84 +16.8
Non-
Hispanic
Black, Non- 5,059 13.05 2,864 7.44 - 43.0
Hispanic
Hispanic 5,176 13.35 2,146 5.56 - 58.4
Asian and 1,835 4.73 2,458 6.39 + 35.1
Pacific
Islander
Native 308 0.79 289 0.75 - 5.1
American I
a. The nomenclature here is chosen to match that provided in
Census figures.
b. I chose this age range because the vast majority of law degree
recipients are contained within it. The population statistics
163. Alfred C. Yen argues that in the hiring of law school professors, Asian Americans, in
contrast to Latinos and African Americans, are, in practice, excluded from affirmative action
policies, in part due to the common belief that Asian Americans are unnecessary beneficiaries of
affirmative action,. Alfred C. Yen, A Statistical Analysis of Asian Americans and the Affirmative
Action Hiring of Law School Faculty, 3 ASIAN L.J. 39, 49 (1996). For an extensive discussion of
the history of the treatment of Asians in America, see generally RONALD T. TAKAKI,
STRANGERS FROM A DIFFERENT SHORE: A HISTORY OF ASIAN AMERICANS (1989); Pat K.
Chew, Asian Americans: The "Reticent" Minority and Their Paradoxes, 36 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1 (1994) (discussing the unique position that Asian Americans are placed in with regard to
many contemporary debates about affirmative action); Harvey Gee, Comment, Changing
Landscapes: The Need for Asian Americans to be Included in the Affirmative Action Debate, 32
GONZ. L. REV. 621 (1996) (outlining how Asian Americans have traditionally been excluded
from class action suits and court discussion of affirmative action).
164. One might be tempted here to use the term "overrepresented" to describe the
difference between percentages of representation of racial groups in law schools as compared to
in the population as a whole. This Article will occasionally use this term as a sort of short-hand,
though it will later dispute the term's applicability to minority groups such as Asian Americans.
165. Similar but consistent figures are provided by Paul Brest and Miranda Oshige, who
also provide socioeconomic data on different races. See Paul Brest & Miranda Oshige,
Affirmative Action for Whom?, 47 STAN. L. REV. 855 (1995).
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are from July 1, 1998, whereas the law degree statistics are
from 1996-1997, meaning that you have to shift the age range
at graduation back one year. To be sure, there are many
students over 33, and perhaps even a few under 24, who
receive law degrees, but to include these age ranges would
have risked being over-inclusive. (In general, the racial
disparities would have been made even more extreme.)
Statistics are given in thousands and from the U.S. Census
Bureau, Population Projections Program (visited July 23, 2000)
<http://www.census.gov/population/projections/nation/
summary/np-t3-a.txt>.
c. Based upon a total United States population 25-34 years old
of 38,774,000. Id. Figures add up to slightly more than
100% due to rounding.
d. Statistics are from Morgan, supra note 161. The statistics
provided here are consistent with, though not exactly the
same as, minority enrollment figures released by the
American Bar Association for third year law students. ABA
Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar,
Minority Enrollment 1971-1999 (visited July 23, 2000)
<http://www.abanet.org/legaled/statistics/minstats.html>.
I chose to use the statistics from the National Center for
Education Statistics because the ABA report did not provide
figures for white enrollment. One important thing to note
from the ABA report, though, is that total minority
enrollment among third year students was higher in 1996-97
than in any year prior or since.
e. Based upon a total of 38,473 J.D.s and LL.B.s awarded in
1997. Morgan, supra note 161 (subtracting statistics for
"Race/ethnicity unknown" and "Nonresident alien" to make
the results more reflective of racial composition). Figures are
slightly less than 100% due to rounding.
f. Calculated by the increase or decrease of the percentage of
law degree recipients for the particular race from the
percentage the race comprises of the national population for
the specified age range.
The number of minority applications and admissions declined
even more dramatically after Hopwood v. Texas and Proposition 209 in
California prohibiting the use of race in admissions at state
universities. 166 For example, there were 19 African Americans and 26
166. For a discussion of the constitutionality of the decision by the University of California
Board of Regents to eliminate affirmative action in admissions decisions (which was later
publicly approved in Proposition 209), see generally Linda D. Martin, Affirmative Action in
University of California Admissions: An Examination of the Constitutionality of Resolution SP-1, 19
WHITTIER L. REV. 373, 419 (1997) (concluding that the actions of the University of California
to eliminate affirmative action violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
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Hispanics in an entering class of about 290 at the UCLA School of
Law in 1996, the year before Proposition 209 went into effect.1 67 In
the entering class of 1999, there were 17 Hispanics and only two
African Americans. 168  At Boalt Hall School of Law at the University
of California at Berkeley, there was only one African American in the
entering class of 1997, and that student had deferred admission from
the previous year.169 The following year, Boalt received 20% fewer
applications from African Americans, despite an increase of 10% in
overall applications.1 ' After Hopwood, 7' minority applications at the
University of Texas Law School, which once produced more minority
lawyers than any other law school in the country, dropped by over half
for African Americans the year following the decision, down from 225
to 111.112 Some suggest the drop in applications is due more to
Amendment because they deny minorities access to institutions of higher learning). Martin
incorrectly assumes that by eliminating affirmative action, the University of California is taking
an affirmative step toward abrogating a duty that it is legally bound to perform. In other words,
the only way that Martin's argument is coherent is if there exists a positive legal obligation to
institute affirmative action policies. This is quite a bit different from claiming either that there is
a moral obligation to institute affirmative action policies or that affirmative action policies are
legally acceptable though not legally compelled, both of which are arguments that this Article
makes.
167. Timothy Kudo, Low Minority Enrollment at UCLA Law School Raises Concerns,
DAILY BRUIN, Oct. 22, 1999.
168. Id.
169. Pamela Burdman, Fewer Blacks Applied to Boalt Hall for Fall, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 4,
1998, at A18.
170. Id. Applications by Asian Americans rose 44%, applications by whites 22%, and
applications by Native Americans 39% (though with a small sample size); numbers of
applications by Hispanics remained exactly the same.
171. Following the Hopwood decision, the state legislature adopted a plan whereby the top
10% of a graduating class from any accredited high school in the state is automatically admitted
to any school in the University of Texas system. See generally William E. Forbath & Gerald
Torres, Merit and Diversity After Hopwood, 10 STAN. L. & POLY REV. 185 (1999) (discussing
the merits of the University of Texas plan); Danielle Holley & Delia Spencer, Note, The Texas
Ten Percent Plan, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 245 (1998) (detailing the history behind Texas's
reaction to the Hopwood decision and assessing the effectiveness of the new admissions policy,
concluding that more effort needs to be directed to secondary education). This plan has not been
extended in any form to the law school.
The plan does, though, raise the issue of whether class could be substituted for race in
affirmative action programs. This policy, opponents of affirmative action claim, is fairer, not to
mention more constitutional, than drawing distinctions on the basis of race. See Clint Bolick,
Blacks and Whites on Common Ground, 10 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 155, 158 (1999). There are
empirical questions, however, as to whether or not this would result in a racially diverse class
composition. See Jerome Karabel, No Alternative: The Effects of Color-Blind Admissions in
California, in CHILLING ADMISSIONS, supra note 111, at 38. See also Thomas J. Kane,
Misconceptions in the Debate Over Affirmative Action in College Admissions, in CHILLING
ADMISSIONS, supra note 111, at 28-29 (arguing that explicit acknowledgment of race through
set-aside programs demonstrates the importance of race in society).
172. Scott Baldauf, Minorities Shun Top Texas Law School, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE
MONITOR, Mar. 10, 1998. Applications by Hispanics dropped from 306 to 249.
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political protest and a sense of alienation than, as some opponents of
affirmative action might suggest, to a fear of not being admitted
without preferential treatment. 173  If declining application figures are
due solely to resentment toward the law schools, then such resentment
will fade eventually. Indeed, there is some evidence that applications
and admissions figures are starting to return to pre-1 9 96 levels in both
Texas' and California.'75
However, while this "rebound" might suggest that the dropping
of affirmative action policies will not make things worse, such an
assumption is questionable'7 6 and ignores the huge disparities in
proportional representation for African Americans and Hispanics that
existed prior to the dropping of explicit affirmative action policies and
that continue to exist today. If anything, the disproportion shows that
earlier affirmative action efforts should have been pursued more
aggressively; there is no reason to believe that the elimination of
affirmative action will achieve proportional representation when
moderate forms of affirmative action failed to do so.
Since a large majority of law schools rely heavily on Law School
Aptitude Test (LSAT) scores to determine admissions, 77 it should not
173. Id.
174. Enrollment figures for both blacks and Mexican Americans rose at the University of
Texas Law School from 1997 to 1998 due to increased minority recruitment. Kathleen A.
Graves, Affirmative Action in Law School Admissions: An Analysis of Why Affirmative Action Is
No Longer the Answer... Or Is It?, 23 S. ILL. U. L. J. 149, 160-61 (1998). Graves suggests that
this increase justifies the dropping of affirmative action in school admissions as no longer
necessary, especially since there are other alternatives to increase minority enrollment such as
increased recruiting of minorities, minority tutoring programs, and changes in the admissions
forms. Id. at 168-70; see also Sharon Jayson, UT Law School Doubles its Ranks of New Black
Students, AUSTIN AMERICAN-STATESMAN, July 8, 2000, at B1.
175. An editorial in the San Francisco Chronicle suggests that the increase is due in large
part to increased recruiting efforts of the type once reserved for sports stars, though it also notes
that enrollments for African Americans are still less than half of what they were in 1996 and that
Hispanics also lag behind their 1996 numbers. Editorial, Boalt's New Numbers, S.F. CHRON.,
Aug. 20, 1998, at A28.
176. Linda F. Wightman uses statistical comparisons of undergraduate grade point
averages (UGPAs) and LSAT scores among whites and minorities as correlated to admission
rates to conclude that affirmative action was widely used in law school admissions in 1990-91.
See Linda F. Wightman, The Threat to Diversity in Legal Education: An Empirical Analysis of the
Consequences of Abandoning Race as a Factor in Law School Admissions Decisions, 72 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1, 12 (1997). Roughly speaking, the percentage of applicants admitted for various
minorities, including Asian Americans, was significantly higher than their combined scores alone
would indicate. Id. at 14. Wightman further believes that eliminating affirmative action "would
result in a law school body that mirrored the ethnic makeup of law schools of thirty years ago."
Id. at 50.
For a critique of Wightman's methodology and her resulting analysis, see generally Stephan
Thernstrom, Diversity and Meritocracy in Legal Education: A Critical Evaluation of Linda F.
Wightman's "The Threat to Diversity in Legal Education", 15 CONST. COMMENT. 11 (1998).
177. Of 168 law schools participating in a recent survey, most weighted LSAT scores as
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be surprising that there appears to be a correlation between race and
LSAT scores. Presumably, those students who are somehow
educationally deficient will not score well on the LSAT, but neither
should they have high GPAs. The only alternate explanation is if the
LSAT reflects a different measure of intelligence than does the
student's GPA. While this is certainly a possibility, it is one beyond
the scope of this Article to explore.
A recent study shows that even when controlling for GPA to
minimize other factors such as differences in education, opportunity,
intelligence, etc. that might explain LSAT performance, various
minority groups score lower on the LSAT than do whites.'78 The
study looked at applicants to Boalt Hall from Harvard, Yale, Stanford,
UCLA, and UC Berkeley, all elite undergraduate institutions, and
matched their GPAs to plus or minus .10 on a 4.0 scale. 9 The results
show that, controlling for GPA among applicants from 1996 to 1998,
African American applicants to Boalt scored 9.3 points lower on the
LSAT than did whites, Hispanics 6.87 points lower than whites,
Native Americans 3.77 points lower than whites, and Asian American
applicants 2.48 points lower than whites.' °  These results are
especially disturbing considering that a nine-point difference in
average LSAT scores separates the University of Texas School of
Law, ranked in the top twenty law schools in the U.S. News and
World Report annual survey from St. Mary's Law School in Texas,
ranked 133rd in the same survey.l' This is not the place to engage in
an in-depth analysis of whether or not the LSAT is racially or
between 55 and 65% of their admissions formula. GPA made up the remainder of the formula.
ABA Sec. of Legal Educ. & Admissions to the Bar, Report on Diversity in Legal Education (last
visited July 23, 2000) <http://www.abanet.org/legaled/committees/diversity.html>. As an
example, students with an undergraduate GPA ("UGPA") of over 3.75 and LSAT scores of
between 168 and 173 were admitted to Boalt Hall 89% of the time compared to a 44% admission
rate for students with an over 3.75 UGPA but LSAT scores between 162 and 167. William C.
Kidder, The Rise of the Testocracy: An Essay on the LSAT, Conventional Wisdom, and the
Dismantling of Diversity, 9 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 167, 193 (2000).
178. The study was conducted by Testing for the Public, a Berkeley education research
organization, and released before the Committee on Higher Education of the Texas House of
Representatives in September of 1998. Chris Jenkins, Study Finds Racial Bias in LSAT, DAILY
CALIFORNIAN, Nov. 13, 1998.
179. Lori White, LSAT Hurts Minority Students, Study Shows, PITT NEWS, Oct. 19, 1998.
180. Jenkins, supra note 178.
181. Id. A report by the same researcher and organization shows that, ignoring LSAT
scores, white applicants with a GPA of between 3.5 and 3.74 were admitted to law schools
nationally 85% of the time, whereas African American applicants in the same GPA range were
only admitted 76% of the time, Hispanics 80% of the time, Asian Americans 82% of the time, and
Native Americans 81% of the time. Kidder, supra note 177, at 209; Tanya Schevitz, Law Schools
Rely Too Much on Standard Test, Study Says, S.F. CHRON. June 28, 2000, at A26.
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culturally biased."' It is also beyond the scope of this Article to
examine whether or not the LSAT is an accurate predictor of success
in law school, which is its stated purpose.183 However, as this Article
turns to its analysis of The Bell Curve and the book's asserted
connection between race and a genetic basis for intelligence, the results
of this study can be used not just as evidence of racial bias in the
LSAT, which assumes equal intellectual ability, but also as evidence
showing the existence of a genetic connection between race and
intelligence."'
182. For a discussion in support of race neutrality in standardized tests generally, see
HERRNSTEIN & MURRAY, supra note 12, at 277-83. For a claim that the LSAT is not culturally
biased, see Philip D. Shelton, "Top Ten" Misconceptions about the LSAT, LAW SERVS. REP.,
Jan.-Feb. 1999, at 4 (asserting that the rigorous two-year screening process for each question
eliminates racial bias); Wightman, supra note 176, at 34 (asserting that the LSAT is as accurate
or more accurate than UGPA in predicting first-year grades for minority students as compared
to white students (Wightman was formerly the Vice President for Testing, Operations, and
Research for the Law School Admission Council)). For a critique of the supposed race neutrality
of the LSAT, see, among others, David M. White, An Investigation into the Validity and Cultural
Bias of the Law School Admission Test, in TOWARDS A DIVERSIFIED LEGAL PROFESSION 155
(David M. White ed., 1981) (asserting that the LSAT is culturally insensitive); Daria
Roithmayr, Deconstructing the Distinction Between Bias and Merit, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1449, 1490-
93 (1997) (responding to DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, BEYOND ALL REASON:
THE RADICAL ASSAULT ON TRUTH IN AMERICAN LAW (1997) by employing the techniques
of deconstructionism to argue that the LSAT has a historical basis in racism).
183. See Law School Admissions Council, Frequently Asked Questions-LSAT (visited July
27, 2000) <http://www.lsac.org/faqs-and-support-lsat.asp#1>. For a discussion in support of
this proposition, see, among others, DINESH D'SOUZA, THE END OF RACISM 313 (1995)
(claiming that the College Board has "made strenuous effort" to ensure that there is no middle-
class bias in the SAT and that as a result, even critics of the SAT have been unable to detect a
racial bias); T. Anne Cleary, Test Bias: Prediction of Grades of Negro and White Students in
Integrated Colleges, 5 J. EDUC. MEASUREMENT 115 (1968) (arguing that no racial bias can be
detected in aptitude tests and their predictive ability for performance). For a critique of the
predictive ability of LSAT scores, see, among others, James C. Hathaway, The Mythical
Meritocracy of Law School Admissions, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 86, 93 (1984) (claiming that while the
LSAT may be somewhat predictive of minority performance in the first year of law school, it is
not an accurate predictor of performance in later years); Mark Kelman, Concepts of Discrimination
in "General Ability" Job Testing, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1158, 1163-64 (1991) (arguing that
empirical tests of general ability have such low validity in predicting success on the job that, in
light of the disparate racial effects they cause, the tests do not meet the high standards of proof
required by Title VII); Kidder, supra note 177; Susan Sturm & Lani Guinier, The Future of
Affirmative Action: Reclaiming the Innovative Ideal, 84 CAL. L. REV. 953, 957 (1996)
(contending that employing aptitude tests in admissions decisions reinforces social oligarchy by
keeping the wealthy in power).
184. To make this assertion, one would have to find some way to counteract the correction
that the study made for GPA by arguing that GPA, for some reason, is not an accurate predictor
of actual intelligence. In response to the LSAT study just discussed, David Murray of the
Statistical Assessment Service asserts that this study shows just how unreliable GPAs are,
especially as compared to LSAT scores. Brady Dewar & Vassant Kamath, Report Reveals
Discrepancy Between Minority and White LSAT Scores, HARVARD CRIMSON, Oct. 2, 1998.
Richard Herrnstein and Charles Murray do not discuss GPAs in The Bell Curve. Their
discussion of the LSAT is focused on evidence that on average, whites admitted to any given law
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V. THE BELL CURVE AND THE UNDERLYING PREMISES OF
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
One may reasonably ask why this Article bases its discussion of
affirmative action on The Bell Curve, a book that has been widely
criticized and debunked from a variety of angles.' Indeed, none of
the prominent opponents of affirmative action, other than the authors
of The Bell Curve themselves, make a genetic claim for racial
differences in social position or law school admission. Part of this may
be due to the political danger and unsavoriness of suggesting that
African Americans and other minorities are genetically inferior to
whites, but more likely a genetic basis for opposition to affirmative
action is simply, in most instances, not necessary. The reason for this
is because those who oppose affirmative action, even if they do so on
the basis of what they claim to be racially neutral grounds, implicitly
rely upon the same premises that would exist were they to assume that
racial minorities were genetically less intelligent than whites. At least,
this is one of the contentions that this Article will examine in the
discussion that follows.
The reason for the use of The Bell Curve in this Article is because
the different positions on affirmative action necessarily focus on
beliefs about the relationship between merit and intelligence.
Examining situations in which differences in intelligence are
immutable provides helpful reference points by which to reflect on the
school had a higher mean score on the LSAT than African Americans, Hispanics, and Asian
Americans, with the largest disparities existing between whites and African Americans and the
smallest between Asian Americans and whites. HERRNSTEIN & MURRAY, supra note 12, at
455-56. For example, there were over 1,100 whites with LSAT scores of 170 or higher (out of a
possible 180), but only 3 African Americans with such scores. Id. at 456 (these results do not, of
course, control for socio-economic status). Herrnstein and Murray point to this small number of
high-scoring African Americans as evidence of the heavy reliance upon affirmative action at elite
law schools. Id.
185. This Article leaves criticisms of the methodology and scientific findings contained in
The Bell Curve to others, as this Article would not be adding anything new to such debate.
There are also many critiques of the implications and premises of The Bell Curve in areas other
than affirmative action that are well worth reading. In addition to multiple articles, there have
been several books written and collections of essays compiled in direct response to The Bell
Curve. These books include THE BELL CURVE DEBATE (Russell Jacoby & Naomi Glauberman
eds., 1995) (collecting a variety of documents, including critical responses, relating to The Bell
Curve); THE BELL CURVE WARS: RACE, INTELLIGENCE, AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICA
(Steven Fraser ed., 1995) (collecting a variety of articles responding to The Bell Curve); CLAUDE
S. FISCHER ET AL., INEQUALITY BY DESIGN: CRACKING THE BELL CURVE MYTH (1996)
(exploring the policy implications of and responding to The Bell Curve); INTELLIGENCE, GENES,
AND SUCCESS: SCIENTISTS RESPOND TO THE BELL CURVE (Bernie Devlin et al. eds., 1997)
(collecting responses by scientists to the empirical claims about the relationship between genetics
and intelligence in The Bell Curve); MEASURED LIES: THE BELL CURVE EXAMINED (Joe L.
Kincheloe et al. eds., 1996) (responding chapter by chapter to The Bell Curve).
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principles behind the support of and opposition to affirmative action.
The connection here is not that all whites are more intelligent than all
blacks, or vice versa. 6 Even under the assumption that there are
genetic differences between the two races, some members of the
genetically less intelligent race (those on the top of their scale) will be
more intelligent than some members of the genetically more intelligent
race (those on the bottom of their scale). The point is that
systematically, under this assumption, whites would be advantaged
over blacks. If affirmative action is viewed more in terms of group-
based rights than as a corrective for individual harms, then it is
precisely the systematic effects of race relations to which we should be
looking. Thus, it is important to keep in mind in the following
analysis that we are dealing with groups and not individuals, but that
is how it should be. In this sense, this Article rejects, for the most
part, the holdings of Croson, Adarand, and related cases limiting
affirmative action to instances where past discrimination can be
shown. While this Article's arguments may be more easily paired
with notions of group rights, this does not make the arguments
incompatible with an individual rights framework. For example, we
have already seen in Bakke how the diversity justification for
affirmative action can be presented as based on individual rights, in
this case, the free speech rights of the college or university. The
human dignity arguments that this Article will provide later can also
be cast, as will be seen, either as individual or group rights. What
follows, then, can be viewed as alternate justifications for affirmative
action, even if one does not go so far as to endorse group rights.
Interestingly, Herrnstein and Murray make the claim that "it
matters little whether the genes are involved at all" in ethnic
differences in status in the United States.187 This claim is hard to
believe, especially given all the effort Herrnstein and Murray went
through to show that there is in fact a genetic component to
intelligence. 18  Genuine or not, though, the statement raises serious
questions about the implications for affirmative action if one were to
assume the actual existence of genetic differences in intelligence
between various racial groups. The ways in which these implications
186. Herrnstein and Murray do not claim that it is: they assert that "differences among
individuals are far greater than the differences between groups." HERRNSTEIN & MURRAY,
supra note 12, at 270-71.
187. Id. at 312. For further analysis of this passage, see Mickey Kaus, The "It-Matters-
Little" Gambit, in THE BELL CURVE WARS, supra note 185, at 130-38.
188. Indirectly counter to this, there are scientists who suggest that it is biologically
impossible to distinguish between different races in the first place. See generally L. LUCA
CAVALLI-SFORZA, THE HISTORY AND GEOGRAPHY OF HUMAN GENES (1994); STEPHEN JAY
GOULD, THE MISMEASURE OF MAN (1996).
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change on the basis of different genetic assumptions illustrate the
complexities and inconsistencies of arguments for and against
affirmative action.
This Article will proceed by positing four different (racial or
ethnic) groups of people differentiated by their inherent intelligence
levels; it will then examine pro and con stances on affirmative action in
light of these inherent differences. The groups are as follows:
* Group W is the baseline group; members are of average
intelligence and constitute the majority in society, both
numerically and in terms of their control over wealth and
relations of power and influence.
* Group X is stipulated as being genetically less intelligent
than Group W; members are a numerical minority in
society and are even less represented in positions of wealth,
power, and influence than their overall proportion in the
national population.
Group Y is exactly the same as Group X socially, politically
and economically, but is posited as having exactly the same
inherent intelligence level as Group W.
Group Z is defined as of greater inherent intelligence than
Group W; as for members' social positions, this Article will
look at Group Z in terms of both overrepresentation and
underrepresentation in the target population.
This Article will examine affirmative action in turn between
Group W and each of Groups X, Y, and Z. These abstract group
identifications are used to lessen the charged reactions that a for the
most part hypothetical discussion of actual racial groups would
cause.189 The arguments should remain the same no matter to which
189. Conceivably, different justifications for affirmative action work better or worse for
different racial groups depending on their history and position in society. See generally, Brest &
Oshige, supra note 165 (discussing three justifications for affirmative action, i.e., justice,
diversity, and external benefits (which, as will be seen, mirrors Herrnstein and Murray's three
social concerns surrounding affirmative action) as they relate to African Americans, Native
Americans, Hispanics, and Asian Americans). The analysis of the three different hypothetical
situations set out here would adequately address most of Brest and Oshige's concerns without
getting into specifics about the different races. While it may be socially appropriate to treat
different minority groups differently, it is hard to see how this maps onto the context of
admission to law school unless one wants to argue that African Americans, who (arguably) have a
longer and more appalling history of discrimination, deserve more of a boost from affirmative
action than do other minority racial groups (an argument which Brest and Oshige do not make).
This point may have some salience if recompense for past wrongs is the primary justification for
affirmative action. This Article, however, offers a variety of other justifications for affirmative
action that avoid forcing the decision-maker to pit minority groups against each other to
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racial groups they refer. Where appropriate or necessary, though, this
Article will discuss specific racial groups.
This analysis will be conducted in terms of three primary social
concerns laid out by Herrnstein and Murray: justice, institutional
benefits, and social utility.19 Though Herrnstein and Murray apply
these themes only to the educational context, there is no reason to
believe that they could not be applied to occupational affirmative
action as well, though this Article will focus on the educational
context. All three of these concepts are frequently interconnected, but
it is possible, with some slight oversimplification, to analyze each one
separately.
Justice, which Herrnstein and Murray refer to as "just
desserts," '' addresses issues of fairness by touching upon core beliefs
about equality and human worth. It proceeds by asking tough
questions, such as whether a wealthy student who belongs to a racial
minority, someone who has had the best education money can buy,
should be admitted to law school over a poor white student who has
had to struggle through substandard schools.192
The concept of institutional benefits encompasses the effects of
affirmative action on daily life in the law school itself.'93 Effects that
would be included in institutional benefits include the composition of
the class,194 racial tension or acceptance at the school, the effects of
affirmative action on the level of education at the school, and the
reputation of the school.
Finally, social utility addresses the external (i.e., outside of the
law school) costs and benefits of engaging in or not engaging in
determine which has suffered the most in the past.
190. HERRNSTEIN & MURRAY, supra note 12, at 459-62. Herrnstein and Murray admit
borrowing these concepts from ROBERT E. KLITGAARD, CHOOSING ELITES (1985). For an
analysis of the principles both for and against affirmative action laid out along seven dimensions,
see generally, Louis P. Pojman, The Moral Status of Affirmative Action, in AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION: SOCIAL JUSTICE OR REVERSE DISCRIMINATION, supra note 60, at 175-97.
191. Id. at 461.
192. Id. at 461-62. Carol Swain et al. raised this exact question to both blacks and whites
of differing incomes and educational attainment using different combinations of white, black,
privileged, and underprivileged students. The results are complicated, but they generally
indicate that while there is no significant preference for either the privileged A student or the
underprivileged B student when both are of the same race, there is a preference for privileged
black A students over underprivileged white B students. See Swain, supra note 3, at 165-75.
193. HERRNSTEIN & MURRAY, supra note 12, at 459.
194. Herrnstein and Murray note that it may be a perfectly acceptable goal for educational
institutions to give preference to children of alumni or to decide whether they want to emphasize
sports or music in their admissions policy. Id. The latter dilemma is presumably not one that
will arise in the law school context, but it is possible that law schools give preference to children
of alumni in order to encourage increased donations to the school.
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affirmative action. 195 This concept concerns both the message that the
law school's admissions policy sends to potential students and the
effect that law students will have on society at large once they
graduate.
This Article's assessment of the different scenarios in relation to
stances for and against affirmative action will reflect the author's
beliefs as to whether or not the position taken is internally coherent
and morally acceptable based upon the underlying principles revealed
by each of the core concepts.
A. X < W: Affirmative Action When the Minority Is Genetically Less
Intelligent Than the Majority
If the group (X) potentially to be benefited by affirmative action
were genetically less intelligent than the group in the majority (W),
then opponents of affirmative action would have a strong justice claim
against a policy favoring Group X in the aggregate. Everyone should
be treated equally, which requires the implementation of a merit-
based method of evaluating law school applicants. There may, of
course, be limited instances in which a particular person from Group
X is more intelligent, and consequently, more qualified for admission
to law school than certain members of Group W, gaining admission in
his or her own right, but this person would not then need an
affirmative action program and would be admitted instead under a
purely merit-based admissions system. However, a policy in which a
certain number of members of Group X were automatically admitted
to law school or in which members of Group X were given some
weight or preference over members of Group W in the admissions
process would almost certainly create situations where the less
intelligent would be admitted instead of those who are more
qualified.' 96 This, opponents of affirmative action argue, would
destroy the neutrality fostered by a merit-based system of admissions.
More importantly, the genetic connection to intelligence removes
the counter-argument by proponents of affirmative action that Group
X is the victim of social oppression and that this is the cause for its
lower levels of education entering the law school application process
and for its lower LSAT scores. Opposition to affirmative action under
this scenario is premised on the notion that merit should be the
195. Id. at 460-61.
196. For this reason, Clint Bolick disparagingly describes affirmative action as a tool for
"social engineers." CLINT BOLICK, THE AFFIRMATIVE ACTION FRAUD: CAN WE RESTORE
THE AMERICAN CIVIL RIGHTS VISION? 76 (1996).
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deciding factor in law school admissions. 9 7 While there may be some
concern to ensure that the proportion of underrepresentation of Group
X in law schools mirrors its relative lack of intelligence, 198 as long as
this condition is satisfied, there can be no complaints about the
underrepresentation of Group X.
Furthermore, a belief in the genetic inferiority of Group X
potentially leads to negative repercussions, opponents of affirmative
action would argue, if members are admitted to Group W's society.
In terms of institutional benefits, admitting demonstrably less
intelligent students (Group X) over those of high merit (Group W)
might very well cause resentment among those not admitted and
possibly among those in society writ large who view the law school as
acting fundamentally unfairly.'99 The abolition of affirmative action
in this scenario would also result in the concentration of the most
intelligent students of that level of educational achievement in any
given law school."' This would raise the level of education at the law
school because courses could be pitched at a higher intellectual level
than would be possible if the professor needed to slow down or "dumb
down" the course in order to make sure that the less intelligent
members of Group X were following along.20'
197. This emphasis on merit seems consistent with recent Supreme Court cases in the
occupational context like Adarand, which limit racial preference to demonstrated past
discrimination and a narrowly tailored program to remedy that harm. See generally, Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995). By rejecting other possible justifications for
affirmative action, the Supreme Court is implicitly saying that apart from a very limited
exception, merit is the only justifiable basis for awarding government contracts. In other words,
without race as a means for distributing contracts, only merit (judged in terms of skill and price)
remains.
198. For example, the figures above calculate that African Americans are underrepresented
in law schools at a rate of 43% less than their percentage of the population. This
underrepresentation would be acceptable if 43% of African Americans could be shown to be less
intelligent than some standard baseline for intelligence.
It is not necessary to show in the converse that whites and Asian Americans, who are
overrepresented in law school populations, are more intelligent than the standard baseline
because they could be exactly at the baseline and simply filling in the spots not taken by African
Americans, Hispanics, and Native Americans.
199. Indeed, Stephan and Abigail Thernstrom argue that most of the gains made by
African Americans occurred before affirmative action programs were instituted and that
affirmative action has in fact exacerbated racial divisiveness. See STEPHAN THERNSTROM &
ABIGAIL THERNSTROM, AMERICA IN BLACK AND WHITE: ONE NATION, INDIVISIBLE 95
(1997).
200. In other words, not only would the most intelligent students be concentrated in the
most elite law schools but the next most intelligent students would be concentrated in the best of
the second-tier law schools and so on down the line.
201. In the occupational context, Herrnstein and Murray give evidence of how affirmative
action has led to decreased performance among schoolteachers, the Washington D.C. police
force, and Seattle plumbers and pipefitters. HERRNSTEIN & MURRAY, supra note 12, at 492-98.
Though Herrnstein and Murray do not make these allegations for university admissions, it
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From a social utility perspective, increasing the level of education
would raise the productivity of the now better-prepared graduates. °2
It would also instill a positive work ethic in society by reinforcing the
belief that one succeeds on the basis of merit. 23 These benefits,
opponents of affirmative action would argue, outweigh any harm that
would result from a socially and economically segregated society, 24
especially considering the huge affront to justice that would occur if
the less intelligent Group X members were given spots in law school
over their more deserving Group W counterparts.
In this scenario, the main response of affirmative action
proponents is to question the value of merit as the principle
determining factor in law school admissions. Proponents cannot argue
that Group X members should be admitted on the basis of past social
oppression because we are assuming that there is a scientific/genetic
explanation for their past failures in educational attainment.
would not be much of a stretch for them to do so. Hermstein and Murray do spend a whole
chapter (Chapter 18) discussing "The Leveling of American Education," but they do not
specifically trace this leveling to affirmative action.
202. Arguably, this would be offset by collecting less intelligent students at the bottom-
ranked law schools. This argument, though, is premised on the false notion that all law school
applicants are admitted to some law school somewhere regardless of their GPA and LSAT
scores. A more realistic scenario would be to say that Group X students, who, absent affirmative
action, are not admitted into the top law schools, will displace those Group X students who
would go to middle-ranked law schools under an affirmative action policy. Those displaced
students will, in turn, displace Group X students in the bottom-ranked law schools, who will, in
turn, not go to law school at all. This argument is supported by findings by Linda F.
Wightman. See Wightman, supra note 176, at 26-27.
Even if all applicants did go to some law school somewhere, the benefits of concentrating the
intelligent would not be completely offset by the corresponding concentration of the less
intelligent as long as one believes that innovation is more likely to come from those with higher
levels of education (meaning that the more highly educated those at elite law schools become, the
more likely they are to be innovative).
203. See Charles L. Geshekter, Affirmative Action in Principle, Non- Discrimination in Fact:
Higher Education After Proposition 209, 10 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 205, 213 (1995) (asserting
that affirmative action should aim at "increasing the number of people who can compete on an
equal basis, not choosing some of them based on skin color or penalizing one generation ad
infinitum for the sins of another").
Under the current scenario, though, this reasoning would only make sense for Group W
members, since Group X members would be led to believe that they could never succeed, at least
not collectively.
204. Herrnstein and Murray argue for a sort of welfare state to support the increasingly less
intelligent segment of the population that results from social intellectual segregation and the
corresponding mating of the less intelligent only with others who are less intelligent (leading to a
Darwinian decline in intelligence for that subset of the population). HERRNSTEIN & MURRAY,
supra note 12, at 510, 523. This includes holding the state responsible for childcare in inner
cities and an increased acceptance of strict policing of the underclass. See id. at 523-24.
Herrnstein and Murray mean this prognosis as a warning, but it is hard to imagine that their
suggested solution of equal rights and greater acceptance of one's proper place in the economy
would avert the situation they fear most. See id. at 507, 530, 538.
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Proponents of affirmative action cannot even argue that admitting
Group X members to law school will inspire future improvement
among other Group X members because there is an inherent barrier to
that improvement. However, the argument for alternatives to merit is
a strong one because it rests upon principles of innate human dignity
and worth.2 5  These principles would have to assert that justice
requires equal participation in all aspects of society by members of
different racial groups, regardless of their inherent abilities.20 6
One such argument for human dignity is advanced by Charles
Taylor, who calls for "a politics of equal recognition.""2 7 The politics
of recognition requires, Taylor asserts, that all individuals be
recognized as having worth equal to every other human being, thus
implying an equal voice in a participatory democratic society. When
this participation is denied, the "misrecognized" group suffers a"grievous wound" to its sense of identity, resulting in "a crippling self
hatred."2 8  To the extent that circumstances prevent Group X
members from participating fully in society, their dignity and sense of
self-identity is harmed. This can only be corrected by a program such
as affirmative action that values participation by all over a meritocratic
system based upon competition. "Fairness," then, refers not to the
idea that admission is based solely on supposedly objective test scores,
but rather to the notion that social groups must be viewed in relation
to each other.209
205. There is a long and diverse philosophical tradition of support for this position, too
long and diverse to delve into in any great depth. Prominent philosophers in this tradition
include Immanuel Kant (who argues for equal human worth via his Categorical Imperative), Karl
Marx (who staunchly critiques a capitalist system based on merit and proposes instead a
communist society based on the premise "From each according to his ability, to each according
to his needs!"), and John Stuart Mill (who argues for equality for women in The Subjection of
Women and for self-autonomy in On Liberty). See generally IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK
OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS (H.J. Paton trans., Harper & Row eds., 1964); KARL MARX,
THE MARX-ENGELS READER (Robert C. Tucker ed., 1978); JOHN STUART MILL, THE
SUBJECTION OF WOMEN (Susan Moller Okin ed., 1988) (1869); JOHN STUART MILL, ON
LIBERTY (Elizabeth Rapaport ed., 1978).
For an extended attempt to combine legal analysis of the affirmative action debate with
philosophical principles, see generally MITCH ROSENFELD, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND
JUSTICE: A PHILOSOPHICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL INQUIRY (1991).
206. It may still be possible to have a meritocracy within racial groups. One need not go so
far as to advocate a communist society under this scenario in order to achieve equal participation
of the races. Rather, one can argue that because a certain level of intellectual inferiority inheres
to Group X as a whole, that deficiency should be corrected so that the relatively more intelligent
members of Group X are able to participate in the same activities as the more intelligent
members of Group W.
207. Charles Taylor, The Politics of Recognition, in MULTICULTURALISM: EXAMINING
THE POLITICS OF RECOGNITION 26-27 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1994).
208. Id. at 26.
209. See WILLIAM G. BOWEN & DEREK BOK, THE SHAPE OF THE RIVER: LONG-TERM
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Furthermore, because Group X members are genetically less
intelligent than their Group W counterparts, affirmative action is
necessary to overcome this deficiency. Such a principle still forwards
concerns about justice, only it tends to look at justice more in terms of
the group than the individual by focusing on aggregate levels of
participation rather than admissions decisions as they affect individual
applicants. As the earlier comparison of Justice Powell to Justices
Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun in Bakke shows, though, it
is unclear that the Supreme Court would adopt this approach.
210
United States v. Fordice, with its emphasis on addressing the
"lingering effects" of past discrimination,212 might show receptivity to
a more group-based approach to rights, but the line of cases leading up
to Adarand Constructors v. Pena213 suggests that the Court may still
require a narrowly tailored program of remediation for demonstrated
past harms, a stance that relies upon notions of rights as being
attached to individuals and that consequently renders group-based
rights impossible.
Even apart from Supreme Court jurisprudence, the emphasis on
human dignity with regard to Group X can be criticized by opponents
of affirmative action along a couple of different lines. The first is that
by structuring admissions on the basis of nonmeritocratic
qualifications, the very dignity supposedly conveyed is undermined.
In other words, if the dignity inherent in a high-status job like being a
lawyer is based on the high qualifications necessary to gain admission
to the profession in the first place, then will not this dignity be
diminished by loosening the standards of admission?
In response, proponents of affirmative action could argue that
this challenge conflates the dignity attached to membership in the
profession with that gained through equal participation in society. It
may well be the case that the dignity, or perhaps "prestige" is a better
word, of being a lawyer would decline due to the implementation of
affirmative action programs, though there is no evidence of this, but
such a decline in dignity is independent of the dignity inherent in
equal participation in society.
Importantly, this creates a potential productivity cost associated
with ensuring full participation by all racial groups through the loss of
economic output resulting from including people of objectively lesser
CONSEQUENCES OF CONSIDERING RACE IN COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY ADMISSIONS 277
(1998).
210. See text accompanying notes 60-93.
211. 505 U.S. 717 (1992).
212. Id. at 731.
213. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
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intelligence in the workforce, including lawyers. For this reason,
minimum thresholds for admission can be justified because they
increase the likelihood that those admitted to law school will be
successful and will thus gain the level of achievement necessary to
make their participation in society meaningful. This is also important
for keeping the perception of meaningful participation high among
members of society as a way to dampen any resentment Group W
members may have toward Group X members as a result of the
relaxed admissions standards. If Group W members are able to see
that their Group X counterparts become active and successful
members of society after graduating from law school, they will be
more likely to accept small accommodations in admissions standards
than they would if Group X members were admitted to law school and
then failed, either in school or once out in society. Where the line is to
be drawn, both with regard to social perceptions of "accommodations"
and to the trade-off between economic productivity and political
participation by Group X members, is a matter the resolution of which
is beyond the scope of this Article.
Even if Group X is intellectually inferior to Group W,
arguments for human dignity do not lead one to conclude that
admissions should be based on some sort of blind lottery system.
Merit will still play at least some role in any affirmative action
program; it will not, however, be the sole determination in selection.
Given the relative levels of power and influence that come with being
a lawyer, as discussed above, membership in the legal profession and
the participation in the decision-making processes of society that it
allows will almost certainly far outweigh any harm to the reputation of
the profession itself caused by admitting those without the absolute
highest merit-based qualifications." 4
This participation will also lead to social utility benefits such as
the ability to shape public policy in favor of one's race.2"5 Part of the
214. Duncan Kennedy argues in favor of affirmative action programs for law school faculty
not only because of "the general democratic principle that people should be represented in the
institutions that have power over their lives," but also because cultural diversity will improve
legal scholarship. Duncan Kennedy, A Cultural Pluralist Case for Affirmative Action in Legal
Academia, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE
MOVEMENT 159 (Kimberlfi Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995).
215. Against justice-based arguments for affirmative action, one could counter that the
same logic for admitting intellectually inferior racial groups to law schools should be applied to
granting basketball scholarships to short people who cannot jump. The justice-based response
would be to say that because human dignity comes from participation in society and not from
membership on a basketball team, there is a logical reason for relaxing standards of admission in
the first instance and not the second. This is invariably a moral claim based on one's personal
beliefs, and the utilitarian might look for reasons beyond moral beliefs, suggesting that people
could be taught that human dignity does not come from participation in society just like it does
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goal of affirmative action is to place people in positions in society
where they can be decision-makers. This ability is more about power
than it is about intelligence. Thus, even if Group X were genetically
less intelligent than Group W, placing Group X members in positions
of power will ensure that their perspectives are heard and that they
will have some impact on policy decisions in society. It might be
thought that Group W members may, to a limited extent, be able to
manipulate Group X members, but in order for this manipulation to
be meaningful, the disparity in innate intelligence would have to be
enormous. Setting a minimum threshold of competence assures that
those who are given the benefits of affirmative action will be able to be
effective in their schools or jobs. Rather, decision-making in the
business and policy realms is often more about access to the means of
carrying one's decisions into effect than it is about relatively small
differences in levels of intelligence.16 To the extent that Group X
members have shared experiences and beliefs, the decisions of one of
its members will likely both reflect and have a positive impact on other
members of the group.217  Thus, allowing members of a minority
group access to the decision-making process will benefit not only those
who have obtained positions of power, but also the entire group. In
this sense, arguments for human dignity in affirmative action create a
group right as well as an individual right when viewed from a social
utility perspective.
The second line of criticism of affirmative action as advancing
human dignity is that there is no reason to accommodate members of a
racial group in distinction to other societal classifications. For
example, instead of classifying groups on the basis of racial identity,
one could just as well assume no genetic racial disparities in
intelligence and classify groups according to scores on basic
intelligence tests. In other words, you could create a non-racial group
of people with mid-level intelligence scores and ask why their claims
for admission to law schools should be any different than those of
Group X.
not come from playing basketball. The social utility argument answers this criticism by
outlining the secondary effects that can be achieved through ensuring participation in society,
effects which cannot result from playing basketball.
216. The phrase "policy realm" as used in this Article does not refer to elected positions,
since supposedly Group X would not be legally hindered in electing its members to public office
if the group possessed a sufficient population concentration or was able to build adequate
coalitions. Rather, it refers to promotions within government agencies and other policy forming
institutions.
217. This is somewhat of an exaggeration and mischaracterization. However, there is some
truth to this assertion and certainly more truth than if only Group W members were in positions
of power.
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The response would be that race simply cannot be separated
from identity in the way that this hypothetical suggests. In society
today, race is constitutive of identity in ways that intelligence is not.218
Therefore, the stigmatization that would accompany categorizing
certain races as lacking intelligence would carry over to other areas of
treatment, whereas this extension is much less likely with regard to
something like a generic lack of intelligence. A generic lack of
intelligence not only does not carry stereotypical cultural associations,
it also is not outwardly identifiable. Thus, accommodation to Group
X members on account of their race is a necessary consideration, given
the history of race in this country (if not elsewhere in the world as
well). While there is something to be gained by addressing affirmative
action in the abstract, to go too far in this direction misses much of the
point of why affirmative action is necessary in the first place, even
assuming genetic racial differences in intelligence.
The belief in a colorblind legal system rests on the uneasy
dichotomy that all people should be treated equally while
acknowledging at the same time that they are not, in fact, equal, 219 or
rather, to borrow a phrase from George Orwell's Animal Farm, that
some "are more equal than others." '22 This belief runs dangerously
close to Social Darwinism's motto of "survival of the fittest, especially
considering one is positing a genetic connection to intelligence. 221
Indeed, there is no threat to the power of the majority (Group W) in
instituting a colorblind system of admissions when it knows that on
the whole the minority (Group X) can never catch up. This recalls
Justice Harlan's dissent in Plessy, where he argued against segregation
218. Cf, e.g., Charles R. Lawrence, III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection Reckoning
with Unconscious Racism, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY, supra note 214, at 235 (arguing that the
cultural meaning of racist acts is more important than the intention of the perpetrator); Neil
Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution is Color-Blind", in id. at 257 (contending that premises
of colorblindness have masked the real effects of racial subordination).
219. It is instructive here to compare the government's treatment of those who do not have
high levels of intellectual ability with its treatment of those who are physically disabled. In
effect, the policy in America is that we are not going to help socially disadvantaged or less
intelligent people, only those who are smart but physically disabled. See generally, MARK
KELMAN & GILLIAN LESTER, JUMPING THE QUEUE: AN INQUIRY INTO THE LEGAL
TREATMENT OF STUDENTS WITH LEARNING DISABILITIES, 7-8, 195-226 (1997); Laura F.
Rothstein, The Affirmative Action Debate in Legal Education and the Legal Profession: Lessons
from Disability Discrimination Law, 2 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 1, 19-22 (1998) (arguing that
how one treats qualifications for admittance of the disabled can have broader implications for
affirmative action toward racial classifications).
220. George Orwell, Animal Farm: A Fairy Story, in THE COMPLETE WORKS OF
GEORGE ORWELL, at 90 (Secker & Warburg eds., 1987) (1945).
221. For a discussion of Social Darwinism and The Bell Curve, see generally, Catherine A.
Lugg, Attacking Affirmative Action: Social Darwinism as Public Policy, in MEASURED LIES: THE
BELL CURVE EXAMINED, supra note 185, at 367-90.
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by asserting that blacks will never be a threat to the "white race," who"will continue to be [the dominant race in this country] for all time, if
it remains true to its heritage, and holds fast to the principles of
constitutional liberty. '2 2 In other words, there is no need to create de
jure segregation when society, under a rubric of fairness, will result in
de facto segregation.
This is the situation one would expect to result if Group X was
genetically inferior to Group W. If Group X was truly less intelligent
than Group W, then the results of this "natural" segregation would be
quite tempting for Group W. Group W could maintain its position of
authority without feeling guilt regarding the active suppression of
Group X, whose position in society could essentially be attributed to
bad luck. "Fairness" for Group W members would become a rubric
for maintaining relations of domination,223 just as Justice Harlan did
not feel that whites would cease to be the dominant race as long as
they maintained their cultural heritage.224
Affirmative action proponents' belief in human dignity extends
beyond issues of justice or fairness to arguments about social utility as
well. Affirmative action in a context of genetically-based differences
in intelligence may not be able to inspire future improved achievement
because of the unlikelihood of future success absent continued
affirmative action, but it can send powerful messages about how
different races should be integrated into society as a whole. This
argument draws upon the holding of Brown v. Board of Education,
where segregated schools with equal educational opportunities were
deemed unconstitutional because the very fact of segregation harmed
the "hearts and minds" of the African American school children
involved by instilling "a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the
community. '2   It is hard to imagine anything that would create a
greater sense of inferiority than to have opponents of affirmative
action tell Group X members that they are in fact genetically and
immutably inferior and that as a result, they should not expect to
participate fully at the upper levels of wealth, power, and influence in
226society.
222. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
223. For a similar and more extensive analysis of this argument, see Erin E. Byrnes,
Unmasking White Privilege to Expose the Fallacy of White Innocence: Using a Theory of Moral
Correlativity to Make the Case for Affirmative Action Programs in Education, 41 ARIZ. L. REV.
535, 554-59 (1999).
224. For a discussion of Justice Harlan's Plessy dissent in terms maintaining implicit white
supremacy, see Joel Olson, The Limits of Colorblind and Multicultural Personhood, 2 STAN.
AGORA 1 (2001) <http://www.law.stanford.edu/agora>.
225. 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954).
226. If Group X members are not told of their genetic inferiority, then the motives of
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There is a fundamental tension between human worth and
genetic inferiority. Any attempt to mask this tension in a regime of
equality is disingenuous at best.227 If Group X members are to be
instilled with a sense of equal human worth, then a policy of
affirmative action must be instituted to achieve equal participation in
upper levels of society, since we are positing that they cannot obtain
social betterment as a group through their own skills. Opponents of
affirmative action might argue that such a policy would injure the self-
esteem among Group X members because they would receive
something they did not earn. However, precisely because we are
positing that Group X cannot collectively achieve higher status,
affirmative action becomes the only way to integrate society. As such,
affirmative action teaches members of both Group X and Group W
that their worth comes from the fact of their humanity and not from
their intellectual acumen. This may require proponents of affirmative
action to accept some slowing down of productivity caused by
including people with lesser intellectual skills in elite law schools and
other academic institutions, but this cost is worth the benefit of the
larger moral message that is sent. As Brown says, "education is
perhaps the most important function of state and local governments"
because it provides "the very foundation of good citizenship. ' 28 The
principles of citizenship being taught should be ones of equal human
moral worth.
On an institutional level,229 proponents of affirmative action
argue that the inclusion of racial minorities in law school classes brings
diverse perspectives 230 to the educational setting. 231' According to
Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke, this was, in fact, the only acceptable
Group W must be seriously questioned, as they would be using deception to maintain their
position in the social hierarchy. If Group W members do not themselves know of the inferiority,
we are essentially moved into the scenario in the next subsection, where both groups are posited
to be of equal genetic intelligence, because Group W members could not use the genetic
inferiority of Group X as a justification for their opposition to affirmative action.
227. Recall here the discussion, supra text accompanying note 22, comparing an opposition
to affirmative action to Justice Harlan's dissent in Plessy.
228. 347 U.S. at 493.
229. For institutional arguments by opponents of affirmative action, see infra text
accompanying notes 250-54.
230. See generally RONALD T. TAKAKI, A DIFFERENT MIRROR: A HISTORY OF
MULTICULTURAL AMERICA (1993) (offering accounts of American history from a variety of
ethnic perspectives).
231. Bowen and Bok show that, between 1976 and 1989, a dramatic increase took place
among white students who wanted the ability to have a rapport and work efficiently with people
of different races and cultures and among both African American and white students who
believed that their college experience contributed toward these goals. BOWEN & BOK, supra note
209, at 224, 227.
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justification for using race as a factor in admissions. 23 2 The concern
for diversity was so prevalent in Powell's mind that it allowed him to
overcome concerns with equality and stereotyping.233 Impressively,
Justice Powell was able to argue all of this while still maintaining a
rubric of individual rights by making one's race a part of one's unique
overall identity2 4 and then asserting that schools have a free speech
right to include whatever perspectives and identities they desire in the
composition of the student body.2 3 Academic freedom, though not aspecifically enumerated constitutional right, has long been viewed as a
special concern of the First Amendment. The freedom of a university
to make its own judgments as to education includes the selection of its
student body. If a free speech interest in diversity is really to be of
primary concern, then the (posited) fact that Group X is of lower
intelligence than Group W is an unfortunate side effect, but one that a
law school is allowed to ignore in order to obtain its desired student
body.236 This logic fits well with the social science research cited by
Gratz v. Bollinger,237 which pointed to measurable benefits for
students of all races from the inclusion of diverse racial perspectives in
the university. In other words, a law school can accept the negative of
being forced to lower the educational level of its classes in favor of the
larger positive of having a diversity of perspectives and identities in its
student body.2 38 This stops short of requiring law schools to engage in
232. Regents of the Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 315 (1978). This Article
has already discussed whether this holding can be extended to Justices Blackmun, Marshall,
Brennan, and White or whether it is just Powell's dicta.
233. Id. at 294, 298.
234. Id. at 318.
235. The passage continues:
Thus, in arguing that its universities must be accorded the right to select those
students who will contribute the most to the "robust exchange of ideas," petitioner
invokes a countervailing constitutional interest, that of the First Amendment. In this
light, petitioner must be viewed as seeking to achieve a goal that is of paramount
importance in the fulfillment of its mission.
Id. at 313.
236. Arnold H. Loewy argues that there is a fundamental difference between affirmative
action, which focuses on individuals and addressing past wrongs, and diversity, which necessarily
focuses on the composition of groups as an independent cognizable entity. Arnold H. Loewy,
Taking Bakke Seriously: Distinguishing Diversity from Affirmative Action in the Law School
Admissions Process, 77 N.C. L. REV. 1479, 1480 (1999). This definition, if accepted, cuts against
this Article's attempt to portray affirmative action as a group-based remedy. Loewy does
contend, though, that diversity is itself defensible on constitutional grounds as a justification for
admissions decisions. Id. at 1482.
237. 122 F. Supp. 2d 811, 822 (E.D. Mich. 2000).
238. From an economic standpoint, one could say, following Robert Klitgaard, that Group
X members should be admitted up to the point where their marginal benefit of a contribution to
diversity equals the loss in productivity from the difference between the Group X member
admitted and the corresponding Group W member consequently excluded. See KLITGAARD,
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affirmative action,239 but it is perhaps the best that can be hoped for
after a scientific demonstration of genetic deficiency in intelligence has
taken the force out of the argument that Group X members are in their
social position because of a history of oppression.240
In summation, under the circumstances where a racial minority is
genetically less intelligent than members of the majority, opponents of
affirmative action would argue that giving members of the racial
minority places in law schools for reasons other than merit violates
fundamental principles of justice. This argument would likely be
couched in terms of claiming that everyone should be treated equally,
and the only way to do this is through a neutral system based on
merit. That members of the racial minority are at a genetic
disadvantage is unfortunate but unavoidable. To admit members of
this racial minority disproportionately would not only create
resentment by nonadmitted members of the majority, it would also
result in lowering the level of education provided at the school and,
consequently, a downturn in economic production. Proponents of
affirmative action would respond by asserting an emphasis on human
supra note 190, at 169.
239. Bakke does not force law schools to make race the only motivating factor in
admissions. Other merit-related factors can be analyzed as well. For instance, Bakke itself closes
by attaching an appendix from an amicus curiae brief filed by Columbia University, Harvard
University, Stanford University, and the University of Pennsylvania, which suggested that
admissions committees may want to admit a black student from an inner-city background who
has had to struggle all his or her life over a child of a wealthy black physician. See Regents of
Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 324 (1977). This can be seen as a response to the
contention among opponents of affirmative action that it benefits primarily middle and upper
class African Americans. See William Julius Wilson, Race-Neutral Programs and the Democratic
Coalition, in AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: SOCIAL JUSTICE OR REVERSE DISCRIMINATION?, supra
note 60, at 158-59. Wilson is not an opponent of affirmative action, but he does argue that it
does little for poor African Americans. Id. While to some extent middle- and upper-class
African Americans may benefit the most from affirmative action because they are more likely
than poor African Americans to have the requisite educational background to make themselves
attractive candidates for admission to law schools, preferences can still be given to those who
have struggled more to get where they are, if this is a virtue that is seen as being worth
rewarding. In other words, affirmative action can be modified to help poor African Americans as
well as, or even more than, their middle- and upper-class counterparts.
240. For an argument that an interest in diversity is no less "compelling" than remediation
of past discrimination, see Goodwin Liu, Affirmative Action in Higher Education: The Diversity
Rationale and the Compelling Interest Test, 33 HARV. C.R. -C.L. L. REV. 381, 411-23 (1998). For
an argument to the contrary, i.e. that race-based admissions programs do not survive strict
scrutiny, see Michelle M. Inouye, The Diversity Justification for Affirmative Action in Higher
Education: Is Hopwood v. Texas Right?, 11 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 385,
387-88 (1997). This Article will not engage in this particular constitutional debate, but to the
extent that Liu's arguments are convincing, they lend further credence to this Article's claims.
See also Leslie Yalof Garfield, Squaring Affirmative Action Admissions Policies with Federal
Judicial Guidelines: A Model for the Twenty-First Century, 22 J.C. & U.L. 895, 925-33 (1996)
(accepting the validity of the strict scrutiny standard for admissions policies and attempting to
craft an affirmative action policy that satisfies this standard).
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dignity as an alternative to a merit-based admissions system. Under
this argument, racial minorities need to be admitted to law schools and
other institutions of higher education, despite some of the institutional
and social utility side effects pointed out by the opponents of
affirmative action, so that racial minorities can become functioning
members of society. Furthermore, race is a unique category in
contemporary society, and inclusion of racial minorities will bring
valuable diversity to the educational setting.
B. Y = W: Affirmative Action When There Are No Genetic Differences
in Intelligence
If the minority and majority groups are of equal intelligence (and
the minority group suffers from a lack of proportional representation
in positions of wealth, power, and influence), then the arguments in
favor of affirmative action become even stronger. The arguments
about human worth, diverse perspectives in the educational
institution, and "hearts and minds" remain largely the same,24' but do
not need to be couched in the premise that affirmative action is the
only way to overcome immutable genetic differences in intelligence.
Rather than being concerned with perpetually creating and re-creating
the conditions for equal participation in society through promoting
successive generations of racial minorities, affirmative action can now
be seen as a tool for eventual and permanent correction the effects of
discrimination.242 By positing that Group Y members are of the same
intelligence as their Group W counterparts, we have removed the
possibility of claiming that members of Group Y somehow "deserve"
to be in their socially disadvantaged position."' In other words, if
241. The argument about "hearts and minds" is no longer accepted by opponents of
affirmative action who feel that societal barriers to minority advancement have largely been
removed. This position is summarized by Clint Bolick, who claims that even though racism still
persists, the use of racism "as the primary explanation for social pathologies and racial disparities
simply doesn't cut it as the century draws to a close; and to insist otherwise is to ignore painful
realities." BOLICK, supra note 27, at 5.
242. For a history of African Americans in law schools and the legal profession more
generally, see Edward J. Littlejohn & Leonard S. Rubinowitz, Black Enrollment in Law Schools:
Forward to the Past?, 12 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 415 (1987).
243. There remains the question of whether or not those African Americans from relatively
wealthy backgrounds should be allowed to benefit from affirmative action. Herrnstein and
Murray contend that whites from socially disadvantaged backgrounds deserve to be given
preference in admissions over African Americans from wealthy backgrounds. HERRNSTEIN &
MURRAY, supra note 12, at 465. As explained in a previous footnote, these preferences can be
incorporated into an admissions program as so desired, since race is to remain only one factor
among many in admissions decisions. However, Herrnstein and Murray's preference is based
upon an emphasis on merit that the law school may not want to adopt. Instead, admissions
departments may feel that the importance of race outweighs socio-economic status in creating a
diverse student body. This Article sticks by its contention that there remain important
2001] 1135
Seattle University Law Review
members of Group Y possess the inherent ability to attain positions of
wealth, power, and influence, then their failure to do so must be due to
some force or combination of forces that is holding them back. As
Cheryl Harris argues, "[a]ffirmative action begins the essential work
of rethinking rights, power, equality, race, and property from the
perspective of those whose access to each of these has been limited by
their oppression. '24 4 Any credible conception of justice must have at
its core the removal of those barriers to advancement.
This removal of barriers, opponents of affirmative action would
contend, does not necessarily require the imposition of an affirmative
action policy in law school admissions. For one thing, it may be
argued that Group Y members have failed to become part of the social
elite because of cultural motivations that shift their priorities away
from study patterns or because of career paths that lead them away
from advancement into the social elite.245 There is some possibility of
this being the case, but this argument appears, in most part, to be an
excuse to calm the minds of the majority and prevent them from
thinking that they are hindering the success of the minority. If
cultural explanations for a lack of achievement do exist, they are more
likely to have been caused by the majority culture itself than to be an
outgrowth of a system of positively held values in Group y. 246
Furthermore, even if there are cultural explanations for Group Y
members' lack of social success, there may be ways to alter affirmative
action programs to counteract those differences and still allow them to
move into elite positions in society.
differences in perspectives between wealthy whites and wealthy African Americans, as indicated
by numerous stories of the latter being unable to catch a cab, to give but one example.
244. Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY, supra note 214,
at 288.
245. See generally D'SOUZA, supra note 183 (arguing both that African Americans have
suffered from a cultural breakdown and that they have become overly dependent on government
support). Clint Bolick, a prominent opponent of affirmative action, rejects this assertion, arguing
that blacks and whites in fact "continue to share common values and aspirations." Bolick, supra
note 171, at 156.
246. This is a very broad assertion, about which many books, articles, essays, and novels
have been written. This Article will point only to two of such works, both of which concern self-
image and the law in support of this Article's claim, because citing more sources is unlikely to
convince those who believe in cultural failings as the cause of a lack of social success. See PAUL
M. BARRETT, THE GOOD BLACK: A TRUE STORY OF RACE IN AMERICA (1999) (relating the
story of Lawrence Mungin, an African American graduate of Harvard Law School who, despite a
promising start, gradually came to feel marginalized in his law firm and was eventually denied
partnership); Lani Guinier et al., Becoming Gentlemen: Women's Experiences at One Ivy League
Law School, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1994) (discussing the negative self-image that law school
instills in women, leading to lower academic achievement). See also David B. Wilkins, On Being
Good and Black, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1924 (1999) (reviewing PAUL M. BARRETT, THE GOOD
BLACK: A TRUE STORY OF RACE IN AMERICA (1999) (summarizing reactions to Barrett's
book)).
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Indeed, counteracting a negative social image is one of the
primary social utility justifications advanced by proponents of
affirmative action. Because there is no genetic barrier to advancement
for Group Y, placing Group Y members in positions of authority may
have a genuinely meaningful inspirational effect. Seeing that it is
possible for fellow members of their race to succeed, younger Group Y
members may work hard in school and elsewhere in order to achieve
similar success rather than give up trying out of the belief that their
efforts will be for naught.247 Opponents of affirmative action may
counter that knowing one does not have to achieve as high a level of
educational attainment as Group W members will have the reverse
effect of discouraging Group Y members from working hard.248
However, it is doubtful that many minorities see affirmative action as
a guarantee of success. Rather, they likely view it as creating at least
the opportunity for success if one works hard. This view of
affirmative action sees it as leveling a playing field that has for so long
been skewed. This leveling does not create new advantages for
minorities. Rather, it only counteracts existing disadvantages.249
From an institutional standpoint, opponents of affirmative action
often argue that it generates racial tension and resentment on campus
by creating at least the assumption that a certain portion of the student
body did not "earn" its spots at the law school.2"' This can
subsequently result in both resentment by whites who feel unfairly
treated 2"' and a sense of self-doubt among the minorities at the school,
247. See Brest & Oshige, supra note 165, at 864, 870 (1995); Pojman, supra note 190, at
178-79. It is because of the sense of group identity that race-based admissions creates and the
resulting inspirational effects, what Brest and Oshige call the "multiplier effect," that they reject
class-based affirmative action programs. Because such programs would invariably incorporate
some poor whites and exclude wealthy minorities, the effects of affirmative action on group
identity would be diluted. See Brest & Oshige, supra note 165, at 898.
248. See, e.g., Dinesh D'Souza & Christopher Edley, Jr., Affirmative Action Debate: Should
Race-Based Affirmative Action Be Abandoned as a National Policy?, 60 ALB. L. REV. 425, 431
(1996); Jay B. Howd, Race-Exclusive Scholarships in Federally-Assisted Colleges and Universities-
Will They Survive?, 16 S. ILL. U. L.J. 451, 451 (1992). Charles Murray makes this claim
elsewhere about the effects of welfare on discouraging its recipients from seeking jobs and
bettering themselves. CHARLES MURRAY, LOSING GROUND: AMERICAN SOCIAL POLICY,
1950-1980 58, 205-18 (1984). For a response to these claims, see BOWEN & BOK, supra note
209, at 260.
249. In unveiling affirmative action as a new government policy, President Lyndon
Johnson prefaced the program by asserting, "You do not take a person who for years has been
hobbled by chains, and liberate him, bring him up to the starting line and then say 'you are free
to compete with all the others."' Lyndon B. Johnson, Commencement Speech at Howard
University, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 1965, at A14.
250. See, e.g., HERRNSTEIN & MURRAY, supra note 12, at 472-73; Graves, supra note 174,
at 165; Carl Cohen, Heritage Foundation, Race Preference in College Admissions, Lecture No.
611, Apr. 29, 1998.
251. Frederick R. Lynch, Casualties and More Casualties: Surviving Affirmative Action
11372001]
Seattle University Law Review
regardless of their qualifications for admission.5 2  While this
sentiment certainly exists, and while it may even be widespread among
members of both the majority and the minority,2 3 it is also entirely
possible, as seems to be the case following Hopwood and Proposition
209, that a decline in minority enrollment caused by abolishing
affirmative action will also result in racial tensions by creating an
increasingly alienated minority population.5 4
Furthermore, despite years of affirmative action policies,
enrollment figures among many minorities are still woefully
inadequate. African Americans are underrepresented in law schools
by 43%, and Hispanics are even more underrepresented at 58.4%.215 If
whites feel threatened by these racial minorities, they are grossly
overreacting.256 Any sense of inferiority felt by African Americans
and Hispanics is likely imposed on them by misinformed whites who,
for some reason, believe that law schools and other educational
institutions are being taken over by undeserving minorities.257
Otherwise, one is forced to ask oneself why, if African Americans and
Hispanics are getting a bounty of admission spots they do not deserve,
there are so few of them in the student population.
One possible but rather depressing response is that African
Americans and Hispanics are even less prepared for and deserving of
admission to law school than their 43% and 58.4% underrepresentation
(More or Less), in AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: SOCIAL JUSTICE OR REVERSE DISCRIMINATION?,
supra note 60, at 90-98.
252. See Shelby Steele, Affirmative Action: The Price of Preference, in AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION: SOCIAL JUSTICE OR REVERSE DISCRIMINATION?, supra note 60, at 136.
253. Charles Murray, Affirmative Racism, in DEBATING AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: RACE,
GENDER, ETHNICITY, AND THE POLITICS OF INCLUSION 207 (Nicolaus Mills ed., 1994). For
Bowen and Bok's response to this claim, see BOWEN & BOK, supra note 209, at 263.
254. See Baldauf, supra note 172.
255. See table on page 1107. This Article will address the 35.1% "overrepresentation" of
Asian Americans in the next subsection.
256. Lest one think that law school admission is a unique situation, similar results can be
found in other advanced degree fields. For example, whites received 72% of M.D.s in 1996-97,
whereas African Americans received 7.3%, Hispanics 4.6%, Native Americans 0.72%, and Asian
Americans 15.4%. MORGAN, supra note 161. These results reveal that if anything, whites
should feel threatened by Asian Americans and not African Americans or Hispanics. African
Americans and Hispanics are not taking a disproportionate number of spots from whites.
257. To those whites who feel that minorities, take African Americans for example, are
"unfairly" benefited by affirmative action, this Article poses this question: If you could take (or
recommend that your children take) a pill that would change your skin color and appearance to
that of a black person but change nothing else about your personality or intelligence, would you
take the pill? The author imagines that few whites would-not out of racial pride, but out of a
recognition of the overwhelming racism that still exists in this country and the resulting negative
experiences they would face. These negatives outweigh any benefits the white-now-black person
would gain in the law school admissions process.
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figures indicate. 28 This reflects the larger argument among opponents
of affirmative action, which is that despite their potential for high
educational attainment, upon application to law school, Group Y
members do not possess the requisite skills for success. The argument
goes like this: Admission to law school, especially to elite law schools,
is premised on the idea that the admitted students have obtained
quality educations prior to beginning law school. However, many of
those admitted to law schools through affirmative action programs, it
is contended, have failed to acquire the educational background
necessary to succeed because of poor experiences in college, high
school, or however far back one wants to go. 2 9 Thus, if affirmative
action is ever appropriate, it is too late by the time one reaches the law
school level. Rather, the only way to help Group Y members is to
improve their educational opportunities earlier in life.26°
This line of thinking recalls the earlier merit arguments in the
discussion of Group X, though without the sinister halo of Social
Darwinism. Both arguments, however, are premised on the equation
of justice with merit, which this Article has already questioned on
human dignity and equal worth grounds. Law schools are free,
according to Bakke's reliance on the First Amendment Freedom of
Speech Clause, to choose what values to emphasize in their admissions
process. A selection process based solely on merit stands a strong
possibility of creating an overly competitive environment that results
in an unpleasant law school experience because students come to see
their personal worth only in terms of outperforming their
classmates. 6 ' In addition, there is evidence to suggest that there is no
correlation between law school grades and success in legal practice.262
Opponents of affirmative action suggest that admitting minority
students not adequately prepared for school results in higher dropout
rates, and there is some evidence of this.263 However, there is also
258. Furthermore, Clint Bolick charges affirmative action with diverting attention away
from the problems of unpreparedness by minorities by focusing on racial tensions instead of
student qualifications. See BOLICK, supra note 27, at 80.
259. See, e.g., Wells, supra note 124.
260. See id.
261. A recent study by Alexander Astin found that there is a negative correlation between
social activism and LSAT scores. ALEXANDER W. ASTIN, WHAT MATTERS IN COLLEGE:
FOUR CRITICAL YEARS REVISITED 213 (1993). Furthermore, there is a positive correlation
between LSAT scores and a hedonistic personality. Id.
262. David L. Chambers et al., Doing Well & Doing Good: The Careers of Minority and
White Graduates of the University of Michigan Law School, 1970-1996, 42 L. QUADRANGLE
NOTES 60, 70-71 (1999). Chambers also points out that minority graduates from the University
of Michigan Law School have quite comparable bar passage rates to whites and have
accomplished this for the past three decades. Id. at 63-64.
263. Even proponents of affirmative action like Bowen and Bok provide statistics showing
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evidence to suggest a lack of correlation between SAT scores and
graduation rates among undergraduate African Americans,264 a result
that perhaps could be extended to law school students as well. These
findings call into question the contention that those admitted through
affirmative action programs are poor selections to comprise a law
school class. Indeed, there may even be a positive correlation between
racial diversity and objective measurements such as retention and
GPAs, as well as more subjective criteria such as overall satisfaction
and intellectual and social self-confidence.26 If there is no correlation
between affirmative action admittance and success in school (along a
variety of other measures), then why not do both? Why not spend
more resources on early educational opportunities for minorities in the
front end and assist them with affirmative action at the tail end?266
The resistance to affirmative action for law school admissions
points to a hidden underlying premise of its opponents. Let us
assume for the sake of argument that there is a real connection
between being admitted through affirmative action and poor
performance in school. Presumably, many of these minority students
admitted to elite schools via affirmative action will get well-paying
jobs, even if, arguably, they are not the most qualified for such jobs
compared to merit-admitted students at second-tier schools.267
Because they will have well-paying jobs and can afford to live in good
neighborhoods, they consequently can send their children to good
schools. If there is no genetic link to intelligence, then these minority
students from Group Y should be able to compete on an equal level in
a pure merit-based system with students from Group W.26 The
worst that will happen then is that there will be a temporary sacrifice
in economic productivity. Instead, opponents of affirmative action
prefer to sacrifice the current generation of underprivileged minorities.
Opponents of affirmative action may claim that human dignity comes
through individual self-achievement disassociated from a system of
lower college graduation rates for African Americans than for whites when controlling for SAT
scores and the selectivity of the schools. BOWEN & BOK, supra note 209, at 61-62.
264. BOWEN & BOK, supra note 209, at 63.
265. See Alger, supra note 152, at 80 (1998) (citing a study in an unpublished dissertation
by Mitchell J. Chang).
266. This is the sentiment expressed by John Payton, a lawyer fighting to preserve racial
preferences in university admissions, in response to arguments advanced by Clint Bolick. See
Wells, supra note 124.
267. See BOWEN & BOK, supra note 209, at 139.
268. This is presuming there is no cultural explanation for a lack of success. This Article
also does not dismiss the contention that there are other important values to an admissions
system than merit; this Article is merely engaging opponents of affirmative action on their own
terms.
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affirmative action that helps those who have not "earned" their
success, 269 but this presumes a level playing field that simply does not
exist.
Arguments against affirmative action for those who meet at least
a minimum threshold of competence2" are, in essence, only internally
coherent if members of the disadvantaged minorities are in fact
perpetually less intelligent than the majority. This is to say that in
light of the dramatic underrepresentation of Hispanics and African
Americans in law schools and other measures of social status, the
perpetual exclusion of these minorities from access to the means to
better themselves makes no sense if placing them in higher social
brackets through affirmative action will result in the eventual
equalization of the races. Otherwise, opponents of affirmative action
would be arguing in favor of segregation of the races because of their
desire to maintain a social policy that systematically discriminates
against minorities.
Affirmative action can achieve integration not just in the future
but in the present as well. The counter-argument to this claim is that
if the primary concern is providing younger members of Group Y
with a quality education, it should be possible to do this without
dragging along undeserving older members of Group Y. This
position, though, ignores its own psychological impact. The majority
in Plessy asserted that if blacks feel a sense of inferiority because of
being unable to engage with whites in the same activities, it is "solely
because the colored race chooses to put that construction upon it." '271
Yet, opponents of affirmative action reach a similar result by denying
current Group Y members the opportunity to go to the same law
schools as Group W.
If Group Y is truly of the same inherent intelligence level as
Group W, its lack of attainment on merit-based scales must be due to
past discrimination, regardless of whether such discrimination can be
linked to specific perpetrators (probably it cannot), or must be viewed
more generally.272 Without the genetic link to poor intelligence,
269. This is essentially the position advanced by Clint Bolick in his labeling an end to
affirmative action "empowerment" for blacks in America. See Bolick, supra note 171, at 1 59.
270. This admissions policy is one of the "experiments" that the ABA Committee on
Diversity in Legal Education recommends to increase minority enrollment in law schools. ABA
Comm. on Diversity in Legal Educ., Report of the Committee on Diversity in Legal Education (last
visited July 23, 2000) <http://www.abanet.org/legaled/committees/diversity.html>.
271. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896).
272. Such a stance may require at least some recognition of group-based rights, a position,
as discussed earlier, the Court is not willing to take. As this Article will argue in the next
paragraph, though, it may be possible to get around this by relying upon Sweatt v. Painter and
U.S. v. Fordice. Given the nature of this Article's discussion of relations between groups, it
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Group Y members cannot be said to "deserve" social disadvantages.
The exclusion from elite law schools and a resulting sense of
inferiority is either due to this past discrimination, in which case it
should be remedied through affirmative action, or it is all in the heads
of Group Y members, as was said about blacks in Plessy. Opponents
of affirmative action, then, are forced either to abandon their policy
position or to implicitly embrace the racist arguments put forth in
Plessy and later rejected and overturned in Brown. If the "hearts and
minds" of applicants to law schools from Group Y are to be protected,
then they must be allowed to integrate into the rest of society through
a program of affirmative action.
It is not sufficient to say that the more intelligent members of
Group Y, who by hypothesis do not possess the educational
background of equivalent percentile Group W members, still have the
opportunity to attend nonelite law schools. The Court in Sweatt v.
Painter held that members of different races had to be provided with
equivalent law school experiences, including faculty, libraries, extra-
curricular activities, and even subjective elements such as school
reputation and alumni support.273 This is impossible to achieve if
different racial groups are segregated into different law schools, even if
this segregation is de facto and not de jure. Yet, if the only reason for
lack of educational attainment for Group Y members is past
discrimination, which is an entirely unjustifiable reason for excluding
them from activities enjoyed by Group W members, Group Y
members must be given some preference in admission to law school.
Indeed, this is the message of Fordice in striking down Mississippi's de
facto "dual" system of colleges and universities for blacks and
whites.274 States must act affirmatively to eliminate the effects of prior
discrimination and segregation 275 This logically calls for the
implementation of affirmative action to correct the socio-economic
disadvantage that its victims do not deserve. Only by assuming that
minorities are genetically inferior to whites can opponents of
affirmative action get away from in effect arguing for segregation of
the races. However, as discussed in the previous subsection (on
Group X), assuming genetic inferiority logically leads to a segregated
society as well, there is no meaningful difference between these two
should not be surprising that the arguments advanced in this Article are better suited for a
group-based view of rights. Indeed, since the premise of this Article's argument is that Group
W is systematically, as opposed to individually, suppressing either Group X or Group Y, it is
hard to see how it could be otherwise.
273. 339 U.S. 629, 633-34 (1950).
274. United States v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717 (1992).
275. Id. at 731.
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positions. In this sense, perhaps Herrnstein and Murray were correct
when they claimed that "it matters little whether the genes are
involved '276 in how the socially and educationally disadvantaged are to
be treated-opponents of affirmative action in effect assume that
Group X and Group Y are the same.
C. Z > W: Affirmative Action When the Minority Is Genetically More
Intelligent Than the Majority
The possibility that a socially disadvantaged group may actually
be genetically more intelligent than those in the numerical majority
raises interesting problems for both proponents and opponents of
affirmative action. A lot turns on whether Group Z members are
adequately represented in law school. Throughout this thought
experiment, this Article has avoided the use of racial identifications in
an attempt both to avoid potentially inflammatory statements and to
show that the underlying principles on both sides of the affirmative
action debate are independent of race; it should be relatively clear here
that this Article is referring to Asian Americans.277 Let us refer to this
situation as Group Z1.
The fact of the matter is that Asian Americans are
"overrepresented" '278 in law schools 35.1% in relation to their
percentage of the national population.279 If Asian Americans truly are
276. HERRNSTEIN & MURRAY, supra note 12, at 312.
277. The evidence on whether or not Asian Americans are actually more intelligent than
whites is mixed. Asian Americans reportedly have higher SAT scores than whites.
HERRNSTEIN & MURRAY, supra note 12, at 301. However, they also have been shown to score
lower on the LSAT, though they are still the best among minority groups when controlling for
GPAs. See Jenkins, supra note 178. Herrnstein and Murray contend that it is necessary to
differentiate between East Asians (Chinese, Japanese, and possibly Koreans) and other Asians.
HERRNSTEIN & MURRAY, supra note 12, at 272. One possible explanation of why there is a
difference in these test scores is that Asians are particularly adept at math skills, which are tested
in the SAT, but not the LSAT. Herrnstein and Murray refute this contention, pushing instead
for a genetic explanation of differences in test scores. HERRNSTEIN & MURRAY, supra note 12,
at 300. Part of this may have to do with language difficulties for first and second generation
Asian Americans. Whether or not this means that Asian Americans who have no language
difficulties should score higher on verbal as well as mathematical tests is up for speculation.
Such a discussion is beyond the scope of this Article.
278. For a discussion of why it is inappropriate to talk about Asian Americans in terms of
overrepresentation despite disproportionate enrollment in a particular institution of higher
learning, see Jerry Kang, Negative Action Against Asian Americans: The Internal Instability of
Dworkin's Defense ofAffirmative Action, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 15 (1996).
279. Asian Americans complete high school and college at a higher percentage than do
whites; in 1980, the percentage was almost double in the case of college (39.8% to 21.3% for men
and 27% to 13.3% for women). Stanley Sue & Sumie Okazaki, Asian American Educational
Achievements: A Phenomenon in Search of an Explanation, in THE ASIAN AMERICAN
EDUCATIONAL EXPERIENCE 133, 134 (Don T. Nakanishi & Tina Yamano Nishida eds., 1995).
This higher rate of college completion may partially explain why Asian Americans are
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more intelligent than whites, then this would seem to vindicate the
merit-based system advocated by opponents of affirmative action.280
There is even some fear that Asian Americans are the victims of
reverse discrimination.28' Opponents could not argue that affirmative
action for Group Z, results in the lowering of educational standards,
nor that it creates justifiable racial resentment.282 However, since the
overrepresentation of Asian Americans is a situation that opponents
would supposedly approve of, assuming the parameters of Group Z, as
being genetically more intelligent, this should not be a problem.283
proportionately more represented in law schools than whites, though there is no empirical
justification for drawing a causal connection here.
Nakanishi and Nishida further suggest that one reason why Asian Americans are relatively
successful in education is because they are closed out of other avenues of success, such as politics,
sports, and entertainment, making educational attainment the only significant means by which to
better themselves. Id. at 141. See also Ki-Taek Chun, The Myth of Asian American Success and
Its Educational Ramifications, in THE ASIAN AMERICAN EDUCATIONAL EXPERIENCE, supra, at
95 (contesting the notion that educational success is translated into economic success for Asian
Americans).
280. If Asian Americans are not more intelligent than whites, then opponents of affirmative
action would probably claim that Asian Americans, unlike African Americans and Hispanics,
possess similar levels of educational achievement to whites and have received their "boost" into
greater overrepresentation than whites due to benefiting from affirmative action programs.
281. See, e.g., Theodore K. Cheng, Clarifying Some Misconceptions About Affirmative Action
In Higher Education For Asian Americans, 1 U.S.F. J.L. & SOC. CHALLENGES 129, 135-36
(1997) (contending that affirmative action may hurt East Asians, but not other Asian subgroups).
The contention, then, is that if affirmative action and its accompanying limitations on merit-
based admissions were eliminated, there would be even more Asian Americans in law school
than their 35% overrepresentation reveals. This may indeed be the case. It rests, though, on the
belief that Asian Americans are a de facto social majority and that they do not suffer the social
harms and stigma associated with being nonwhite. Affirmative action can be justified as
correcting these social harms. The opposition to affirmative action also assumes that Asian
Americans do not benefit from racial preference in law school admissions. This likely varies
from institution to institution and is beyond the scope of this Article to explore.
282. Whites may object that they are losing spots to Asian Americans, but the only basis
for this argument would be either blatant racism or a reliance on the principle of equal human
worth discussed earlier in relation to proponents of affirmative action in the first scenario
(X<W). Indeed, it may be the case that Asian Americans continue to be the victims of racial
discrimination and would be represented in even higher numbers in law schools absent this
discrimination.
283. Such, however, has not always been the case. Large increases in the numbers of Asian
Americans at colleges and universities in the early 1980s led to a backlash by many whites, who
felt threatened by their increased difficulties in gaining admittance to these institutions. Don T.
Nakanishi, A Quota on Excellence? The Asian American Admissions Debate, in THE ASIAN
AMERICAN EDUCATIONAL EXPERIENCE, supra note 279, at 273, 275. This discomfort is ironic
considering that whites had for so long excluded African Americans and Hispanics on
supposedly meritocratic grounds but appealed to their principles when they were the ones
supposedly on the short end of the stick. This points to how a supposedly morally neutral means
for determining admissions like test scores can often be employed to serve fundamentally racist
ends. See L. Ling-Chi Wang, Meritocracy and Diversity in Higher Education: Americans in the
Post-Bakke Era, in THE ASIAN AMERICAN EDUCATIONAL EXPERIENCE, supra note 279, at 285
(comparing quota limits on Asian Americans to earlier quota limits on Jewish-Americans and
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Serious problems would arise, though, if members of Group Z
(i.e. posited as being genetically more intelligent than Group W) were
not Asian Americans, but, say, African Americans, a racial group that
is vastly underrepresented in law schools. Let us refer to this scenario
as Group Z,. Opponents of affirmative action would then have no
reasonable grounds on which to rest their claims. They might still
argue for a merit-based system, but since a regime of affirmative
action would have failed to elevate Group Z2 members to their
deserved place of overrepresentation in law school classes, it is hard to
see what justifications there could be for dropping affirmative action
altogether.284 Rather, the failure of affirmative action to correct law
school enrollments would signal deep-seated racial animosity and
discrimination. In fact, the indication of past discrimination might be
strong enough to encourage supposed opponents of affirmative action
to suggest the need for a narrowly tailored remedy of even more
aggressive affirmative action. Perhaps the only argument that those
still opposed to affirmative action could marshal in their favor would
be a desire to maintain stability and avoid the massive social upheaval
that would be required to place the more meritorious yet socially-
disadvantaged Group Z 2 members in positions of wealth, power, and
influence.
The response of proponents of affirmative action to either
situation is a bit more complicated. In the case of Group Z2, its
members are underrepresented in law school and elsewhere. The
proponents' claim that this underrepresentation is due to social
oppression becomes much stronger, as hinted in the critique of the
opponents' arguments in the previous paragraph. This social
oppression may be located in inferior primary schooling, so
proponents of affirmative action still open themselves up to the charge
that affirmative action in law school is not the proper place to correct
existing inequities. This argument becomes strained by the very
believable proposition that Group Z2 members would be able to
succeed in law school or on the job, if only given the chance, because
their intellectual abilities are superior to Group W members. Due to
this increased ability to succeed, the inspirational goals of affirmative
action become much stronger.
concluding that the limits are a form of latent racism against Asian Americans). See generally
Eugenia Escueta & Eileen O'Brien, Asian Americans in Higher Education: Trends and Issues, in
THE ASIAN AMERICAN EDUCATIONAL EXPERIENCE, supra note 279, at 259 (detailing trends in
preparation for and attendance at institutions of higher learning by various sub-categories of
Asian Americans).
284. The author has not found any sources that engage this line of argument.
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However, proponents of affirmative action tread a dangerous line
if they suggest that Group Z 2 members deserve to be admitted to law
school because of their superior intellectual ability. To do so would be
to fall into their opponents' merit-based claims and weaken the
proponents' positive claims for members of Groups X and Y.
Proponents of affirmative action cannot offer the social utility claim
that an admissions preference for Group Z2 members would instill a
sense of justice in the mechanics of the admissions process, since such
an argument also relies upon the merit-based grounds the proponents
wish to avoid. Similarly, proponents of affirmative action could not
make the institutional claim that admitting Group Z, members raises
the intelligence level of the student body. Arguments in favor of
diversity, overcoming social oppression, and inspiring others remain
and become stronger in the case of the latter two. However, these
principles must be kept separate from the temptation to make
arguments of desert, lest proponents of affirmative action become no
different than their opponents.
In the case of Group Z1 members, who are overrepresented in law
school enrollment, the position of the proponents is more complicated,
though by no means impossible to defend.28 Gone are the claims of
social oppression, because any past oppression has apparently been
overcome.286 Gone as well is the justification that affirmative action
provides inspiration for others to go to law school, as this does not
appear to be a problem. The key comes through an emphasis on the
primary remaining argument in favor of affirmative action: diversity
of the student body and student experiences. Those who make
meritocratic arguments may ask how this is possible, given that any
diversity goals are supposedly satisfied by the stipulated fact that there
is a higher percentage of Group Z1 members in law school than there is
in the general population. Yet, the purpose of diversity in academic
institutions, drawing from First Amendment academic freedom and
285. For a discussion of the tension between admissions rates and a felt need for affirmative
action among Asian Americans to correct past wrongs, see generally Selena Dong, "Too Many
Asians": The Challenge of Fighting Discrimination Against Asian Americans and Preserving
Affirmative Action, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1027 (1995) (discussing racial limits at Lowell High
School, a prestigious public magnet school in San Francisco). For an update of this case, see
generally David I. Levine, The Chinese American Challenge to Court-Mandated Quotas in San
Francisco's Public Schools: Notes from a (Partisan) Participant-Observer, 16 HARV.
BLACKLETTERJ. 39 (2000).
286. This Article works off the premise that this is in fact the case. As suggested earlier, it
is still possible that Asian Americans experience some racial discrimination and that their
representation in law schools should be higher than it actually is. Under such a scenario, the
justifications for affirmative action would expand to include all of those discussed with regard to
Group Y.
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freedom of speech principles presented by Justice Powell in Bakke,28 7
is to expose students to different perspectives in such a way as to
broaden their horizons, not just for the sake of diversity alone.288
Asian Americans have historically been discriminated against in this
country and their perspectives have been excluded from mainstream
thought .289 Thus, to include Asian Americans in concerns about
diversity yields no fewer benefits than does the inclusion of African
Americans or Hispanics. 29 This is the "robust exchange of ideas" to
which Justice Powell refers in Bakke.291
In order for these exchanges to be meaningful, though, there
needs to be a critical mass of Group Z1 members at the law school to
maximize the opportunities for interaction and thus for a "robust
exchange of ideas" with Group W members.292 It is unclear where
this threshold should be placed, but known statistics can be used to
show the positive effects of affirmative action. To take the example of
Asian Americans, even with their supposed "overrepresentation,"
there are still 12.5 times as many whites in law school. 2" To put this
287. Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978).
288. While this Article discusses Asian Americans here, the same principles also apply to
Native Americans, who are roughly proportionally represented in law schools. A serious
numbers problem arises in designing an affirmative action program, though, when you consider
the existence of different racial identifications by members of different tribes. The author
remembers asking a fellow student at Stanford if she preferred the term "Indian" or "Native
American." She responded that she did not consider herself either but preferred "Navajo." The
author is not sure how many commonly-recognized Native American tribes there are in this
country, but his guess is that it is several dozen. If a law school were to admit one member of
each tribe (assuming it could find an adequate number of qualified applicants and not lose those
applicants to another law school), there would be a greatly disproportionate number of Native
Americans in the law school as a whole. This problem is lessened with Asian Americans, whose
racial identification exists on the level of nationalities (a larger sample size), while it still exists in
relation to any individual law school. It is possible to avoid this problem by taking law schools
collectively, but it is not clear how to design an affirmative action program to accommodate this.
To the extent that different racial identifications impact concerns of cultural diversity and
inspiration to younger members of the race, small population sizes exacerbate the problem.
289. See generally Harvey Gee, Beyond Black and White: Selected Writings by Asian
Americans within the Critical Race Theory Movement, 30 ST. MARY'S L.J. 759 (1999) (providing
an overview of writings on the relationship between Asian Americans and American identity).
290. For a defense of this position, including both a discussion of the historical
mistreatment of Asian Americans and ways in which affirmative action creates a better society,
see generally Gabriel J. Chin et al., Beyond Self-Interest: Asian Pacific Americans Toward a
Community of Justice, A Policy Analysis of Affirmative Action, 4 UCLA ASIAN PAC. AM. L.J. 129
(1996).
291. 438 U.S. at 313.
292. See Expert Report of Patricia Gurin, in THE COMPELLING NEED FOR DIVERSITY IN
HIGHER EDUCATION 99-234 (John A. Payton ed., 1999); Gary Orfield & Dean Whitla,
Diversity and Legal Education: Student Experiences in Leading Law Schools (last visited July 23,
2000) <http://www.law.harvard.edu/civilrights/publications/lawsurvey.html> (concluding
from survey results that diversity enhances college experience).
293. Figures are adapted from those provided in the table on page 1107.
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in a different perspective, the current population of Asian American
law students averages out to about 13.4 for every law school in the
country. 1 4  If Asian Americans were represented in law schools in
exact proportion to their percentage of the relevant age group in the
general population, there would be approximately 10 Asian Americans
in any given law school.29 This difference of 3.4 students is somewhat
significant, but the question then becomes how much more interaction
other students at the law school will have because of the presence of
those "extra" Asian Americans.296 The average law school contains
217.8 students.297 For each individual course to include an Asian
American, there must be more than 21.8 students in each course if
there are 10 Asian Americans at the law school as a whole, while there
need only be 16.3 students per course if there are 13.4 Asian
Americans at the law school.298 In other words, if the law school wants
both to reduce course size and include minority perspectives, it must
admit a greater number of minorities, even if this results in some"overrepresentation." This perspective demonstrates the advantages
to be gained through affirmative action even under the scenario
involving Group Z. Furthermore, the use of affirmative action to
increase the chances that nonminorities will be exposed to minority
perspectives can be applied to all other minority Groups (X, Y, and
Z2) discussed above.
294. Actual results vary greatly, not just because of demographic shifts due to geographic
location and educational attainment (i.e. better-scoring Asian Americans enrolling in higher-
ranked law schools), but also because the entering classes in law schools vary greatly in size. For
example, the entering class at Stanford Law School hovers around 180, whereas its Harvard Law
counterpart typically reaches 540 students. Thus, the calculations provided should be viewed as
representative of larger principles as opposed to contentions about actual experiences in law
schools. The numbers are based on the figures in the chart on page 1107 and a denominator of
184 law schools as provided by the ABA. See Approved Law Schools, supra note 19.
295. Figures are adapted from those provided in the table on page 1107. For this
calculation, this Article includes in the base population those students who declined to state an
ethnicity but it excludes non-resident aliens, creating a base population closer to the national
population as a whole.
296. See BOWEN & BOK, supra note 209, at 235 (discussing the probable effects on
interaction between whites and African Americans in a context of declining African American
enrollment due to the elimination of affirmative action programs).
297. The numbers are based on a law school population of 40,079, which is augmented
from the figures in the chart on page 1107 by the addition of those who declined to state an
ethnicity, non-resident aliens, and the 184 law schools.
298. This assumes that Asian Americans will be distributed evenly among classes at the
law school. This will, of course, never be the case, but the point about relative distribution of
minorities remains the same.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Clearly, a problem exists with regard to the number of African
Americans and Hispanics, and possibly with regard to that of Asian
Americans and Native Americans, admitted to law schools. The
degree to which African Americans and Hispanics are
underrepresented in American law schools is staggering, and
affirmative action has been unable to completely eliminate this
problem. Does this mean that affirmative action should be abandoned
as a failure? No. The fact that disparities still exist does not mean
that affirmative action has not created a better society than would exist
without it. Can a race-neutral admissions policy achieve the goal of an
integrated society? No. As John Payton says, "People didn't
suddenly stop discriminating after the passage of the [1964 Civil
Rights Act]."'299
By playing them off of The Bell Curve, this Article has shown the
flaws and inconsistencies in arguments against affirmative action.
Proponents of affirmative action can suitably maintain their position
against challenges by emphasizing societal goals of diversity and
human dignity. These principles transcend different levels of
educational attainment by members of different racial groups.
Politically, this is a harder argument to sell than one based on easily
understood objective measures of merit, but it is a battle worth
fighting.
299. Wells, supra note 124.
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